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ABSTRACT 
Both anxiety and depression have been linked with attention and executive deficits, yet the 
nature of these deficits and their clinical implications remain unclear.  Chapter 1 reviews existing 
theories and findings from these literatures, along with key limitations of the existing research.  
Chapter 2 examines relations between worry, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and 
working memory capacity (WMC).  Results revealed that reduced WMC was associated with 
symptoms of GAD and elevated levels of worry, both cross-sectionally and prospectively.  In 
contrast, WMC was not associated with depression.  These findings suggest that reduced WMC 
may play a role in the etiology of excessive worry.  Chapter 3 examines executive deficits 
associated with current and past symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).  Results 
revealed that current (MDD) symptoms were associated with deficits in inhibition – nevertheless, 
these deficits were not unique to depression, but were also associated with measures of state 
mood and current GAD symptoms, suggesting that they may simply be a by-product of general 
distress.  In contrast, set-shifting deficits were uniquely associated with past MDD symptoms, 
suggesting that these deficits may reflect an ongoing vulnerability to depression.  Chapter 4 
examines individual differences in inattentional blindness (IB).  Across two independent 
samples, results revealed that attention and executive abilities (e.g., multiple object tracking 
skills, WMC) did not predict whether participants noticed the unexpected stimulus, but levels of 
anxiety and depression did.  Specifically, results revealed a significant three-way interaction 
between worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression predicting IB.  Chapter 5 discusses a 
number of important directions for future research on attention and executive deficits associated 
with dimensions of anxiety and depression. 
   
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………....1 
 
CHAPTER 2: WORRY AND WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY …………………………..16 
 
CHAPTER 3: DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING……………30 
 
CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE IN INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS…………..42 
 












Impact and significance of anxiety and depression 
 It has been estimated that three out of every ten individuals will meet criteria for a DSM-
IV anxiety disorder at some point during their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005).  Not surprisingly, 
the economic cost of these disorders is tremendous (Greenberg et al., 1999; Lepine, 2002; Rice et 
al., 1998).  Anxiety disorders are a major cause of disability and are associated with increased 
health care utilization (Candilis & Pollack, 1997; Leon et al., 1995; Sanderson & Andrews, 
2002).  These disorders have even been found to increase risk for the development of a number 
of chronic medical conditions (Lecrubier, 2001; Wells et al., 1989). 
Likewise, DSM-IV unipolar mood disorders (i.e., depressive disorders) are both common 
and debilitating.  Major depressive disorder (MDD) is among the most common mental 
disorders; the lifetime prevalence for MDD is approximately 17% (Kessler, et al., 2005).  
Depressive disorders are associated with poor quality of life, which in turn is associated with 
poor work performance and social adjustment (Goldberg & Harrow, 2005; Rapoport et al., 
2005).  In fact, unipolar major depression has been deemed the leading cause of disability 
worldwide (measured in years lived with severe impairment; Lopez & Murray, 1998).  
Furthermore, the lifetime risk of death by suicide for individuals who meet criteria for MDD is 
approximately 3.5%, which corresponds to 30% of all completed suicides by some estimates 
(Blair-West, Cantor, Mellsop, & Eyeson-Annan, 1999).   
Given that anxiety and depressive disorders are both common and debilitating, there is an 
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urgent need for a clear understanding of factors that play a role in the development and/or 
maintenance of these problems.  Once discovered, these factors can play a role in treatment 
planning and development.  Though efficacious treatments for these conditions have been 
developed (see Roth & Fonagy, 2004 for a detailed review), these treatments are by no means a 
panacea.  For example, many studies exploring the long-term efficacy of interventions for 
depressive disorders report high rates of relapse (e.g., Fava et al., 1998; Mintz et al., 1992).  
Furthermore, studies exploring the efficacy of interventions for more chronic anxiety disorders 
(e.g., generalized anxiety disorder) suggests that only a minority of patients are returned to 
“well” status (e.g., Ballenger, 1999; Fisher & Dunham, 1999).  Thus, it is clear that there is 
significant room for improvement. 
Conceptualization of anxiety and depression 
 A clear understanding of the nature of anxiety and depression has important implications 
for research aimed at understanding their causes and impact on functioning, which in turn has 
implications for the treatment of these conditions.  As a result, there has been extensive research 
exploring the nature of both anxiety and depression. 
 One critical question addressed in this research involves the distinction between "normal" 
or "subclinical" anxiety and depression on one hand, and anxiety and depressive disorders on the 
other.  Everyone feels anxious and/or depressed from time to time; so how do these experiences 
differ from those of individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for clinical disorders?  Existing 
taxometric research suggests that normal and pathological anxiety differ quantitatively rather 
than qualitatively (e.g., Ruscio, Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Ruscio, Ruscio, & Keane, 2002).  In 
other words, the difference seems to be one of degree, rather than kind.  Findings for depression 
   
3 
 
are a bit more complex.  The existing evidence suggests that depression in general is dimensional 
in nature (e.g., Beach & Amir, 2003; Franklin et al., 2002; Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000), though there 
may be specific subtypes of depression that are taxonic or categorical (e.g., melancholic 
depression; see Ambrosini et al., 2002, and Haslam & Beck, 1994).   
 Another critical question addressed in research exploring the nature of anxiety and 
depression is how these experiences differ from one another.  In light of the findings discussed 
above, researchers have attempted to identify critical dimensions of anxiety and depression.  
Existing research suggests anxiety and depressive disorders share an important dimension in 
common, which has been described as elevated levels of 'general distress', or 'negative affect' 
(e.g., Clark & Watson, 1991; Joiner et al., 1996; Watson et al., 1995).  In addition to being 
common to both anxiety and depressive disorders, this dimension is shared with a wide range of 
other forms of psychopathology (Ormel et al., 2004).  Importantly, depressive and anxiety 
disorders each have unique components; depression is also characterized by decreased levels of 
positive affect (i.e., anhedonia), whereas anxiety is also characterized by elevated levels of 
physiological arousal (Clark & Watson, 1991; Joiner et al., 1996; Watson et al., 1995).  Finally, 
there is evidence to support the distinction between two "types" of anxiety: somatic anxiety (i.e., 
anxious arousal) and cognitive anxiety (i.e., worry) (e.g., Barlow, 1991; Heller et al., 1997; 
Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, 1978).  Not only can these two dimensions be distinguished 
from one another, they can be distinguished from anhedonia and negative affect (Nitschke et al., 
2001) and are differentially relevant to specific anxiety disorders (e.g., worry is prominent in 
generalized anxiety disorder, whereas anxious arousal is characteristic of panic attacks; Barlow, 
1991; Nitschke et al., 2000). 
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 To summarize, both anxiety and depression (with the possible exception of some 
subtypes of depression) can be conceptualized as dimensional in nature.  Furthermore, research 
has delineated four critical dimensions of anxiety and depression: negative affect, anhedonia, 
anxious arousal, and worry.  Taken together, these findings have two important implications for 
research exploring factors associated with severe anxiety and/or depression.  First, these findings 
suggest that research need not focus on "clinical samples" (i.e., samples that delineate groups on 
the basis of formal diagnostic status), given that existing diagnostic thresholds are largely 
arbitrary.  Rather, researchers may simply collect data using dimensional measures administered 
to unselected groups of participants, as long as there is significant variability within the sample.  
In fact, dimensional conceptualizations of anxiety and depression suggests that novel findings 
related to the causes and/or impact of severe forms of anxiety and depression could have 
implications for understanding less severe forms of these phenomena, and vice versa.  Second, 
researchers need to distinguish among worry, anxious arousal, symptoms of depression specific 
to depressive disorders, and non-specific distress.  Ideally, researchers will generate testable 
hypotheses regarding these specific dimensions and will select measures appropriate to do so.  
Also, it will generally be valuable in any given study to examine at least two dimensions as a 
means of assessing whether the hypothesized relationships are specific to one dimension or are 
common to all dimensions. 
Anxiety, attentional control, and executive control 
 Clinical conceptualizations of anxiety disorders include references to attentional and 
executive control deficits (APA, 2000).  For example, diagnostic criteria for both Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) include ‘difficulty 
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concentrating’ as a part of these disorders, and ‘hypervigilance’ is considered to be a symptom of 
PTSD.  Furthermore, a key feature of both Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and GAD is a 
reported difficulty controlling intrusive and distressing thoughts (obsessive thoughts in OCD, 
worries in GAD).  Nevertheless, the nature of these deficits remains underspecified. 
A large body of literature has examined the association between anxiety and cognitive 
performance.  This literature grew out of interest in the construct of “test anxiety”, which 
emerged from observations that individuals who are anxious tend to perform worse on both 
aptitude and achievement tests (e.g., Cassady & Johnson, 2002).  For some time, the dominant 
theory in this area of research has been the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992).  The basic premise of this theory is that anxiety has a greater effect on "efficiency" than 
on "effectiveness".  In other words, anxiety primarily impairs performance on tasks that require 
rapid information processing.  Nevertheless, anxious individuals may perform just as well on 
tasks that do not require rapid processing because they can compensate by exerting more effort; 
thus, they will perform the task comparably, only more slowly.  This theory posits that the effect 
of anxiety on performance is mediated by the effects of worry on working memory.   
 Despite the popularity of the processing efficiency theory, it has been deemed 
problematic because it does not clearly specify the cognitive processes that are impaired in 
anxious individuals.  To address these concerns, Eysenck and colleagues (2007) recently 
introduced a major revision of the processing efficiency theory, which they refer to as the 
attentional control theory.  According to this theory, attentional processes are central to 
understanding the effects of anxiety on performance.  Specifically, anxiety leads to increased 
influence of the stimulus-driven attentional system (which is “driven” by stimulus salience).  
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Thus, anxiety impairs performance because it reduces attentional control in the presence of 
salient distractors.  To support this assertion, Eysenck and colleagues cite findings from research 
involving self-report measures of distractibility (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982; Derryberry & Reed, 
2002), dual-task studies involving salient secondary tasks (e.g., Dusek et al., 1975; Shapiro & 
Lim, 1989), and tasks involving emotionally-valenced stimuli (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Eysenck and colleagues (2007) argue that theses attentional control deficits associated 
with anxiety emerge because worry specifically impairs the central executive of working 
memory (see Baddeley, 1986).  In support of this, they cite growing evidence to suggest that 
working memory capacity largely reflects individual differences in “executive attention” (see 
Engle, 2002), along with findings from numerous studies showing that high levels of anxiety are 
associated with impaired performance on working memory tasks (e.g., Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; 
Darke, 1988; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; Eysenck et al., 2005; Hayes et al., 2008; MacLeod & 
Donnelan, 1993).  Nevertheless, there have been some inconsistent findings reported regarding 
the precise nature of these working memory deficits (e.g., impairment in verbal vs. spatial 
working memory; see Ikeda et al., 1996 and Shackman et al., 2006 for conflicting findings).  
Furthermore, some null findings have been reported from studies examining associations 
between anxiety and performance on tasks commonly used to measure working memory 
capacity, such as the operation span task (e.g., Santos & Eysenck, 2005).  Finally, most of this 
research focuses on individuals with elevated levels of trait anxiety – thus, the extent to which 
these findings can be generalized to individuals with anxiety disorders is unclear. 
Depression, attentional control, and executive control 
 Difficulty concentrating and distractibility have long been considered to be hallmark 
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features of clinical depression (APA, 2000).  In line with this notion, depressed individuals show 
impaired performance on tasks that require sustained attention, even when these tasks involve 
completely "neutral" or non-emotional stimuli (Mialet et al., 1996; Ottowitz et al., 2002).  For 
example, depressed individuals perform worse than controls on digit-span tasks (e.g., Fossati et 
al., 1999), the Continuous Performance Task (e.g., Cornblatt et al., 1989), the color-word Stroop 
task (e.g., Raskin et al., 1982), and negative priming tasks (e.g., MacQueen et al., 2000).  Thus, 
like anxiety, research seems to confirm the clinical impression that depression is associated with 
attentional control deficits. 
 However, unlike anxiety, there have not been any comprehensive theories proposed to 
explain the mechanisms responsible for this deficit in depression (though some fairly basic 
accounts have been proposed; e.g., Lemelin et al., 1997).  Rather, these findings have primarily 
been considered in the context of the broader literature on cognitive deficits associated with 
depression.  Specifically, depression is also associated with impairments in memory (Burt et al., 
1995), visuospatial processing (Elliot et al., 1996), problem solving (Goddard et al., 1996; Marx 
et al., 1992), and decision making (Conway & Giannopoulous, 1993).  On the basis of these 
findings, some have argued that depression is associated with a general depletion in cognitive 
resources (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994), which in term impairs performance on a wide range of 
cognitive tasks.  Nevertheless, when depressed individuals are given appropriate cues or primes, 
they perform comparably to control participants (e.g., Hertel, 1994; Goddard et al., 2001; Hertel 
& Gerstle, 2003).  As a result, Hertel and colleagues have proposed that depressed individuals 
have difficulty initiating efficient cognitive strategies.   
In line with this notion, Levin and colleagues (2007) have proposed that the wide range 
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of cognitive deficits associated with depression could be accounted for by a fundamental deficit 
in executive functioning (EF).  EF involves the effortful guidance of behavior toward some sort 
of goal; these functions are particularly important in nonroutine situations, and seem to rely 
heavily on the prefrontal cortex (Banich, 2009).  Diagnostic criteria for depressive disorder 
include symptoms that could be construed as reflecting EF deficits (e.g., indecisiveness; APA, 
2000), and research has consistently shown that depression is associated with impaired 
performance on a wide range of EF tasks (for reviews, see Austin et al., 2001; Ottowitz et al., 
2002; Fossati et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 2004; and Levin et al., 2007).  Though most reviews of 
research on this topic have concluded that depression is associated with a broad EF deficit, some 
have concluded that there is stronger evidence for deficits in specific domains of EF (e.g., 
inhibition, see Fossati et al., 2002; shifting, see Austin et al., 2001).  Thus, while there is strong 
evidence to support the notion that depression is associated with an executive functioning deficit, 
the precise nature of this deficit is still unclear. 
Limitations of Existing Research 
As discussed above, research has consistently shown that both anxiety and depression are 
associated with attentional and executive control deficits.  Nevertheless, the existing research has 
some important limitations.  Specifically, most of the existing research in these areas uses: 1) 
imprecise methods to target specific dimensions of anxiety and depression; 2) imprecise 
measures of specific attentional and executive control deficits; and 3) cross-sectional designs. 
 As previously discussed, research has delineated critical dimensions of anxiety and 
depression.  However, the vast majority of the existing research has used: 1) self-report measures 
of anxiety or depression that primarily measure general distress or negative affect (such as the 
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Beck Depression Inventory or the Spielberg State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; see Watson & Clark, 
1984); 2) contrast groups of individuals that are likely to differ on more than one of these 
dimensions; or 3) general mood manipulations.  In other words, researchers have failed to adopt 
appropriate methods to distinguish key dimensions of anxiety and depression, and therefore these 
variables are likely to be confounded in much of the existing research.  This problem may help to 
explain why there is a great deal of overlap in findings from research on cognitive deficits 
associated with anxiety and depression, as well as inconsistencies in the existing research 
(including failures to replicate findings).  Furthermore, most existing research focuses 
exclusively on current symptoms.  This is particularly problematic in research on depression, 
since depressive disorders tend to be episodic in nature (APA, 2000; Kessler et al., 1997).  As a 
result, some individuals who will be considered controls (in group comparison studies) or to 
have low levels of depression (in studies that examine depression dimensionally) will have had 
major depressive episodes in the past and will likely share vulnerability factors with individuals 
who are currently more depressed.   An alternative approach is to use measures designed to tap 
specific and distinguishable dimensions of anxiety and depression, and to assess both past and 
current symptoms. 
Despite these limitations, there is some evidence to support the notion that separate 
dimensions of anxiety and depression may be associated with distinct cognitive deficits.  Most 
importantly, preliminary studies conducted in our laboratory suggest that different dimensions of 
anxiety and depression are associated with different patterns of performance on attention and 
working memory tasks (Bredemeier et al., 2009; Bredemeier et al., in press; Bredemeier et al., 
under review).  Though our findings warrant replication, there are also several indirect lines of 
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evidence that serve to bolster our confidence in this general conclusion.  First, research involving 
conceptually relevant constructs lends some support to the notion that different dimensions of 
anxiety and depression may be associated with distinct cognitive deficits.  For example, low 
levels of positive affect have been linked to general "cognitive inflexibility" and difficulty 
shifting attention (Ashby et al., 1999; Compton et al., 2004), whereas anhedonia has been linked 
to deficits in resource allocation (Dubal et al., 2000; Yee & Miller, 1994).  Given that low levels 
of positive affect are associated with depression (but not anxiety), this suggests that anhedonic 
depression is associated with unique attentional and/or executive control deficits that cannot be 
accounted for by high levels of negative affect and/or comorbid anxiety.  Second, experimental 
manipulations which (imprecisely) induce different emotional states relevant to depression and 
anxiety have been shown to have different effects on cognitive performance (e.g., Gray, 2001; 
Jefferies et al., 2008; Schackman et al., 2006).  For example, Jefferies and colleagues (2008) 
showed that experimentally-induced sadness and anxiety have opposite effects on attentional 
control.  Third, research has shown that different dimensions of anxiety and depression are 
associated with different patterns of brain activity (e.g., Heller et al., 1995; Keller et al., 2000; 
Engels et al., 2010; Nitschke et al., 1999).   In fact, these patterns of brain activation, when 
considered in the context of basic research from cognitive neuroscience, may help to explain the 
nature of the attentional and executive deficits associated with these different dimensions (see 
Bishop, 2007, Mayberg, 1997, and Levin et al., 2007).  Finally, some important differences have 
emerged from research on cognitive biases associated with anxiety and depression.  For example, 
there is evidence that anxiety is associated with biased orienting toward negatively-valenced 
stimuli, whereas this does not seem to be the case for depression (e.g., Mogg et al., 2000).  
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Likewise, depression is associated with explicit memory biases for negative information, but 
anxiety is not (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
 A second key limitation of the existing research on attentional and executive control 
deficits associated with anxiety and depression concerns the cognitive tasks that have been 
utilized.  Specifically, most of the existing work in these areas of research has not employed 
appropriate methods to target specific attentional and executive control mechanisms that have 
been identified in basic cognitive research (see Eysneck et al., 2007 and Miyake et al., 2000 for 
more detailed discussions of this problem).  As a result, performance deficits are often difficult 
to interpret.  For example, in studies using variants of the Stroop task, it is unclear whether 
deficits occur at the input (i.e., attentional) stage or the output (i.e., response selection) stage 
(MacLeod, 1991).  An alternative is using cutting edge methods from cognitive psychology that 
were designed to isolate specific attentional and executive control mechanisms, and (when 
feasible) to use multiple tasks to measure the construct(s) of interest in order to isolate their 
shared variance (and thus eliminate method variance).  
 Given that both anxiety and depression are presumed to be associated with distractibility, 
a logical choice for exploring attentional control deficits associated with anxiety and depression 
is to use tasks designed to measure "attention capture" (Simons, 2000).  Unlike most traditional 
tasks used to study selective attention (which place an emphasis on concentration), tasks within 
the attention capture paradigm focus on the extent to which stimuli that participants are supposed 
to ignore are able to grab or "capture" their attention.  Thus, attention capture tasks avoid 
confounding capture (by distracters) with lapses in attention (i.e., when participants are simply 
not attending to the task, but are also not attending to distracters).  Drawing upon the attention 
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capture paradigm also brings to bear the distinction between implicit and explicit attention 
capture (Simons, 2000).  In implicit attention capture tasks, evidence for attention capture is 
based solely upon behavioral effects (i.e., response time differences between conditions).  In 
explicit attention capture tasks, evidence for attention capture is based upon whether participants 
report noticing the critical distracter.  This distinction is important, as implicit and explicit 
attention capture may involve different processes or mechanisms (see Most & Simons, 2001).  
However, this distinction has been ignored by prominent theories offered to explain attentional 
and executive control deficits associated with anxiety and depression.  Likewise, while relations 
between attentional/executive control and implicit attention capture have been examined (e.g., 
Conway & Kane, 2001; McCabe et al., 2010), relations between attentional/executive control 
and explicit attention capture have not been sufficiently explored. 
 A third key limitation of the existing research on attentional and executive control 
deficits associated with anxiety and depression is that most of this research is cross-sectional, or 
manipulates participants’ mood to examine how this affects cognitive performance.  While this is 
not inherently a limitation, such designs do not permit us to test whether attentional and 
executive control deficits contribute to the development and/or maintenance of anxiety and 
depression.  While most prominent theories offered to explain these phenomena have been silent 
on the issue of causality, much of the terminology used in these areas of research strongly 
implies that these deficits are the result of anxiety and depression (e.g., “anxiety impairs 
attentional control…”, pg. 338, Eysenck et al., 2007; "depression impairs performance in certain 
cognitive tasks…", pg. 228, Williams et al., 2000).  In other words, these deficits seem to be seen 
as epiphenomena, which may play a role in the impairment associated with these conditions, but 
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are not likely to be appropriate targets for intervention and will resolve when the disorders are 
effectively treated.  An alternative view is that attentional and executive control deficits play a 
role in the etiology of anxiety and depression, and thus have important treatment implications.  
Initial support for this view could be obtained using prospective (i.e., longitudinal) designs. 
There is some indirect evidence to suggest that attentional and executive control deficits 
could play a role in the etiology of these conditions.  Specifically, some have argued (e.g., 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005) that basic cognitive processes play a key role in the generation and 
regulation of emotions (this perspective is sometimes referred to as the 'common-systems view').  
Thus, it may follow that basic cognitive deficits can play a role in the etiology of emotional 
disturbances.  There are some intriguing findings to support this view, including evidence for 
overlapping neural substrates associated with cognitive control and emotion regulation (Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005) and evidence that performance on basic cognitive tasks predicts emotional 
reactions to stressful events (Compton et al., 2008).  In line with the common-systems view, 
there are a variety of ways in which attentional and executive control deficits may play a role in 
the development and/or maintenance of anxiety and depression.  First, these deficits may result 
in impairments in daily functioning, which in turn can generate various forms of psychological 
distress, including anxiety and/or depression.  Second, attentional and executive control deficits 
may provide mechanisms through which biased processing of emotional stimuli emerges, which 
in turn have been implicated in the etiology of anxiety and depression (e.g., Gotlib & 
Krasnoperova, 1998; MacLeod et al., 2002; Vasey & MacLeod, 2001).  For example, attentional 
control deficits may lead to biased attention capture by negatively-valenced stimuli in anxious 
individuals (see Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  In line with this notion, some have proposed that an 
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evolutionary function of the stimulus-driven attentional system is to promote detection of 
possible threats in the external environment (see Johnston & Strayer, 2001; Ohman et al., 2001).  
Likewise, executive control deficits may lead to memory biases for negative information in 
depressed individuals.  In line with this notion, some evidence suggests that "overgeneral" 
autobiographical memory (i.e., the tendency to recall categories of events when asked to provide 
specific instances), as opposed to biased recall of specific negative experiences or events per se, 
is associated with risk for depression (e.g., Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Williams, 1996).  Third, 
attentional and executive control deficits may influence individuals' ability to deploy certain 
emotion regulation strategies, which in turn lead to elevated levels of specific dimensions of 
anxiety and depression.  For example, the ability to disengage attention may play a key role in 
the ability to regulate unpleasant emotions, and thus deficits in this ability may lead to more 
frequent, enduring, and/or intense unpleasant emotions (see Bredemeier et al., in press).  
Furthermore, working memory capacity may play a key role in the ability to suppress unwanted 
thoughts (see Brewin & Beaton, 2002), and thus reduced working memory capacity may lead to 
higher levels of worry.  Finally, executive functions may play a key role in the ability to develop, 
implement, and follow through with daily plans and goals (see Banich, 2009), as well as our 
ability to evaluate potentially pleasurable stimuli or activities (see Nuechterlein, 1990).  Thus, EF 
deficits may impair one's ability to initiate and maintain experiences or activities that will 
promote pleasant emotional states. 
Goals of the Present Research 
 The overarching goal of the present research was to explore attentional and executive 
control deficits associated with dimensions of anxiety and depression.  In Chapter 2, we examine 
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cross-sectional and longitudinal relations between working memory capacity and worry.  In 
Chapter 3, we examine relations between dimensions of executive functioning (inhibition and 
set-shifting) and current and past symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder.  In Chapter 4, we 
examine whether working memory capacity, dimensions of executive functioning, and 
dimensions of anxiety and depression predict explicit attention capture (or its inverse, which is 
referred to as  “inattentional blindness”; see Simons, 2000). 




WORRY AND WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), the core feature of which is excessive worry, has a 
lifetime prevalence rate of approximately 5% (Kessler, Walters, & Wittchen, 2004).  Individuals 
with GAD typically report a profound dissatisfaction with their quality of life (Turk, Mennin, 
Fresco, & Heimberg, 2000).  Using data from a 15-site World Health Organization collaborative 
study, Ormel and colleagues (1994) found that of the studied mental health disorders, GAD had 
one of the strongest associations with disability.  In fact, the degree of disability associated with 
GAD is greater than that associated with some chronic medical disorders, including diabetes and 
hypertension (Lecrubier, 2001).   
Cognitive deficits may play a key role in the impairment associated with GAD.  
Difficulty concentrating is a diagnostic feature of the disorder (APA, 2000), and there is ample 
evidence to suggest that anxiety is associated with deficits in cognitive performance (see 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007, for a recent review).  For almost two decades, the 
prominent theory in this area of research has been the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992).  According to this account, worry impairs information processing efficiency by 
disrupting working memory.  Recently, Eysenck and colleagues (2007) introduced a revised 
version of this theory (referred to as the attentional control theory), in which they assert that 
worry specifically disrupts the central executive of working memory.  This suggests that worry 
should be associated with impaired performance on a range of tasks that require working 
memory resources, regardless of the specific nature of the task or content. 
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Largely inspired by the processing efficiency theory, there is now ample evidence to 
suggest that anxiety is associated with working memory deficits (e.g., Ashcraft et al, 2001; 
Darke, 1988; Derakashan & Eysenck, 1998; Elliman et al., 1997; Ikeda et al., 1996; Lavric et al. 
2003; MacLeod et al., 1993; Sorg & Whitney, 1992).  However, the processing efficiency theory 
(as well as the attentional control theory) specifically posits that worry disrupts working 
memory.  Nevertheless, instead of measuring/manipulating worry, most of these studies have 
used general anxiety manipulations or have measured trait anxiety (which is related to, but 
distinguishable from, worry; see Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992).   
Two recent studies directly tested whether worrying leads to working memory 
impairments (Hayes et al., 2008, Leigh & Hirsh, 2011).  In both cases, instructing participants to 
worry led to a decrease in residual working memory resources, relative to other cognitive 
exercises (e.g., thinking positive thoughts, thinking about negative images).  However, these 
effects were only observed in participants with elevated levels of trait worry.  Furthermore, 
worriers also exhibited slightly lower working memory scores in the control conditions.  This 
raises the possibility that worriers have a stable deficit in working memory capacity (WMC) that 
is simply exacerbated when they engage in worry.  In fact, WMC, while influenced by state 
factors, has a strong trait-like component (see Ilkowska & Engle, 2010).  Furthermore, reduced 
WMC has been linked with a wide range of difficulties regulating behavior and cognition (see 
Feldman-Barrett et al., 2004, for a review), which has led to speculations that reduced WMC 
might confer risk for psychopathology (e.g., Ilkowska & Engle, 2010; Unsworth et al., 2005).   
There are several reasons why reduced WMC might cause people to worry more.  
Berenbaum (2010) recently proposed a comprehensive two-stage model of worry in which he 
   
18 
 
argues that worry is initiated by perceptions of threat.  There are at least two ways in which 
reductions in WMC may contribute to enhanced perceptions of threat.  First, people with reduced 
WMC may be more likely to experience negative outcomes (e.g., doing poorly in school) – in 
essence, they have more reason to worry.  Alternatively, these individuals may simply process 
information in a biased fashion, which in turn leads them to overestimate threat.  In line with 
these ideas, WMC is strongly related to fluid intelligence (Kane et al., 2005) as well as 
tendencies to make inferences on the basis of limited information (Singer et al., 1992).  
Berenbaum (2010) also argued that worry is terminated when the threat is accepted.  Again, there 
are at least two ways in which reductions in WMC may prevent people from terminating their 
worries.  First, people with reduced WMC might have difficulty accepting threat because they 
are intolerant of uncertainty.  Alternatively, these individuals may be willing to accept that a 
threat exists, but still have difficulty suppressing their worries once they start.  In line with these 
ideas, reduced WMC has been linked with intolerance of ambiguity (MacDonald et al., 1992) 
and difficulty suppressing unwanted thoughts (Brewin & Beaton, 2002). 
Evidence to support the idea that reduced WMC can lead to excessive worry would have 
important implications for our understanding the etiology of psychopathology, in particular 
GAD.  To our knowledge, no existing research has examined whether GAD is associated with 
reduced WMC.  To provide a preliminary test of this proposal, we examined cross-sectional and 
longitudinal relations between worry, symptoms of GAD, and WMC.  Specifically, college 
students completed three working memory tasks, as well as self-report measures of worry and a 
diagnostic interview to assess symptoms of GAD.  Furthermore, a subset of these participants 
completed an online follow-up survey at the end of the academic semester on which they 
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reported their levels of worry in the past week.  In light of evidence suggesting that depression is 
associated with working memory deficits (e.g., Harvey et al., 2004; Rose & Ebmeier, 2006), we 
also measured anhedonic depression and current symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD) to ensure that any findings that emerged could not be accounted for by co-occurring 
depression or general distress. 
Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred ninety eight college students (56% female), ranging in age from 18 to 26 
years (M = 19.6; SD = 1.7), participated in the study1
                                                            
1 Initially, 209 students participated in the study.  However, 11 participants reported that they were taking psychotropic 
medications.  Specifically, all of these participants were taking anti-depressants and/or stimulant medications.  In light of 
evidence that these medications can, for better or worse, influence cognitive task performance (e.g., Kempton et al., 1999; 
McClintock et al., 2010), these participants were excluded from our analyses. 
.  Most (51.5%) reported being European 
American, 19.2% were Asian American, 4.5% were African American, 9.6% were Latino/a, 
2.0% were Biracial, and 12.1% selected the descriptor “other.”  Of these participants, 163 were 
recruited through the University of Illinois Psychology participant pool and received course 
credit in exchange for their participation.  The remaining 35 participants were recruited using 
flyers targeting individuals who have experienced problems with anxiety and/or depression, 
either recently or in the past.  This recruitment strategy was used to obtain better representation 
of individuals with high levels of anxiety and/or depression in our sample.  Participants recruited 
via these means were paid $10/hour in exchange for their participation.  Only individuals with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision were permitted to participate in the study.  




 Self-report questionnaires.  Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), which is designed to assess general tendencies to 
engage in worry, and the Worry Domains Questionnaire, Short Form (WDQ-SF; Stober & 
Joormann, 2001), which is designed to assess worry about a variety of specific topics.  The 
PSWQ is composed of 16 items (e.g., “My worries overwhelm me”), and past research suggests 
that it has excellent test-retest reliability and good convergent and discriminant validity in 
undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer et al., 1990; Nitschke et al., 2001).  Like the PSWQ, 
the WDQ has been found to have good psychometric properties in undergraduate samples 
(Stober, 1998). The WDQ-SF was developed by selecting 10 items from the original WDQ - two 
items from each of five domains (relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work, 
financial; Tallis et al., 1994).  This version has been shown to have high internal consistency and 
a near perfect correlation with the WDQ long form in an undergraduate sample (Stober & 
Joorman, 2001).  For the purposes of the current study, the work-related items from the WDQ-SF 
were replaced with comparable items pertaining to academics.  Furthermore, the instructions of 
the WDQ-SF were altered slightly.  Participants were asked to rate how often they have been 
worrying about each specific domain in the past week (in order to assess recent levels of worry).  
Past research using suggests that this adaptation provides a reliable and valid measure of recent 
worry (Stober & Bittencourt, 1998).  Internal consistencies (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) 
for the PSWQ and the WDQ in the present sample were .94 and .87, respectively. 
 Anhedonic depression was measured using a relevant subscale from the Mood and 
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al., 1995).  On the MASQ, individuals 
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report how frequently they have experienced a variety of different symptoms during the past 
week.  The anhedonic depression subscale is composed of 22 items related to experiences of 
pleasant mood and symptoms that are specific to depression (e.g., “felt like nothing was very 
enjoyable”, “felt really slowed down”).  Past research indicates that this subscale has good 
convergent and discriminant validity in undergraduate, community, and clinical samples (Watson 
et al., 1995; Nitschke et al., 2001).  Internal consistency in the present sample was .93. 
Diagnostic Interview.  Current symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major 
Depressive Disorder were assessed using the mood and anxiety modules of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Nonpatient Edition (SCID-NP; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
& Williams, 2002).  These interviews were conducted by the lead author (KB), who is an 
advanced doctoral student in clinical psychology and has extensive experience conducting 
diagnostic assessments.  In line with SCID guidelines, “current” was operationalized as 
symptoms experienced in the past month, and each diagnostic criterion was rated on a 3-point 
scale (0 = absent, 1 = subthreshold, 2 = threshold).  Due to time constraints, a subset of the 
sample did not complete the interview (n = 40), so data from these participants were not included 
in analyses involving the interview data.  Thus, the sample size for these analyses was 158. 
Because the rates of current GAD and MDD were fairly low in our sample (6 and 5 
individuals, respectively), along with evidence that both anxiety and depression are dimensional 
in nature (see Brown & Barlow, 2009 and Haslam, 2003), we computed dimensional scores for 
both GAD and MDD by summing clinical ratings for all of the substantive criteria for these 
diagnoses.  Thus, GAD scores could range from 0 to 18 (given that there are 9 criteria, each of 
which is rated between 0 and 2), and MDD ratings could range from 0 to 20 (given that there are 
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10 criteria).  To examine interrater reliability, secondary raters (all of whom where graduate 
students in clinical psychology) listened to 25 randomly selected interviews, and intraclass 
correlations were computed by treating raters as random effects and the individual rater as the 
unit of reliability (see Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).  The intraclass correlations for the current GAD 
and MDD dimensional scores were .96 and .91, respectively.  
Automated operation span task.  Participants completed the automated version of the 
operation span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), which is perhaps the most 
widely used paradigm in cognitive research on WMC.  In this task, participants are presented 
with a set of arithmetic operations (e.g., "(6 x 2) - 5 = ??”) which they must solve as quickly as 
possible, each of which is followed by a letter to remember.  At the end of each set of problems, 
participants are asked to recall the letters that appeared in that set in the proper order, and 
accuracy feedback is provided.  The number of letters in each set varies from three to seven, and 
participants complete three of each set size.  The dependent measure for this task is the OSPAN 
score, computed by summing all of the perfectly recalled sets.  Thus, scores range from 0 to 75.  
Past research suggests that these scores have excellent test-retest reliability (r = .83; Unsworth et 
al., 2005).  The automated OSPAN task is entirely mouse driven, which allows participants to 
complete the task independently.  Furthermore, since letters are used rather than words, 
performance is less reliant on word knowledge than many other memory span tasks (including 
the traditional OSPAN task).  Nevertheless, scores on the automated OSPAN are highly 
correlated with scores on the traditional OSPAN (r = .66; Unsworth et al., 2005). 
Working Memory Tasks 
N-back tasks.  Participants also completed verbal and spatial versions of a two-item n-
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back task, which is perhaps the most widely used paradigm in neuroscience research on working 
memory (see Owen et al., 2005).  In this task, participants view a sequence of 20 capital and 
lower case letters, each of which appears at one of 10 possible spatial locations on a computer 
screen.  When each letter appears, participants are instructed to press the “s” key if the item is the 
same as the item that appeared two back (not the item immediately before it, but the one before 
that), or the “d” key if it is different.  In the letter version of the task, participants report whether 
the item is the same letter as the one that appeared two items earlier, or if it is a different letter.  
In the spatial version, participants report whether the item is in the same spatial location as the 
one that appeared two items earlier.  Each item appears for 500 ms (with a 2000 ms ITI), and 
nonresponses are treated as errors.  Participants completed five blocks of each version, and the 
first block of each was treated as practice.  The dependent measure for this task is percent 
accuracy.   
Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually.  The order of the tasks and questionnaires was 
counter-balanced across participants, while the clinical interview was always administered at the 
end of the session.  Individuals who reported clinically significant symptoms of psychopathology 
during the interview were given treatment recommendations and referrals. 
 Those participants who were undergraduate students, were recruited via the Psychology 
participant pool, and completed the initial portion of the study during the first half of the 
academic semester were asked if they were willing to be contacted for a brief online follow-up 
study during the last two weeks of the same semester.  The timing of the follow-up portion was 
planned to: 1) ensure that there was a sufficient amount of time between measurements; 2) 
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increase the chances that participants who expressed interest would still be available to contact; 
and 3) take advantage of the natural stress manipulation that the academic semester entails 
(based upon the assumption that most undergraduates students experience elevated levels of 
daily stress at the end of the semester).  Those who provided contact information received a 
notification about the follow-up study via email, along with directions for completing the study.  
The follow-up study involved completing online versions of the WDQ-SF and the MASQ 
anhedonic depression scale.  Again, for the follow-up study, the directions of the WDQ-SF were 
altered to assess worry about each specific domain over the past week.  Participants received 
entry into a drawing to win a monetary prize in exchange for their participation. 
Out of the 77 participants who were eligible for the follow-up study, 63 (82%) provided 
contact information; there were no significant differences between those who provided contact 
information and those who declined (in demographics, scores from the questionnaires, or scores 
from the tasks).  Of the individuals who were contacted, 38 (60% response rate) completed the 
online questionnaires; there were no significant differences between those who chose to 
participate in the follow-up and those who declined to participate.  On average, participants 
completed the follow-up survey 64 days after their initial session (range = 36-91). 
Statistical analyses 
Because each participant completed both the PSWQ and WDQ-SF, we computed worry 
composite scores by averaging standardized scores from these two measures.  Likewise, we 
computed composite working memory capacity scores by standardizing the scores from all three 
working memory tasks, then averaging them.   Twenty two participants did not score 
significantly above chance performance (i.e., above 60%) on the 2-back letter task and 28 did not 
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score significantly above chance on the 2-back spatial task; these data were not included in our 
calculations2
To examine cross-sectional relations between the working memory composite scores and 
questionnaire scores, we computed zero-order (Pearson) correlations.  As expected, the 
dimensional diagnostic interview symptom variables were highly skewed.  Thus, we used non-
parametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) for analyses involving these variables.  Finally, for the 
longitudinal data, we conducted hierarchal linear regressions predicting scores at follow-up, 
entering corresponding scores from Time 1 in the first step and the working memory composite 
score in the second step. 
.  Nevertheless, since every participant had a score on at least one of the working 
memory tasks, every participant received a score for the working memory composite. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics for the self-report measures and clinical ratings, along with 
correlations between these measures, are presented in Table 1.  As predicted, there was a 
significant negative relationship between worry composite scores and working memory 
composite scores (r = -.22, p < .01), suggesting that worriers have reduced working memory 
capacity.  Also as predicted, GAD dimensional scores were negatively correlated with working 
memory composite scores (rho = -.15, p < .05).  In contrast, working memory composite scores 
were not associated with either anhedonic depression scores (r = -.02, p = .79) or current MDD 
                                                            
2 On the automated OSPAN task, participants are encouraged to maintain at least 85% accuracy on the arithmetic problems.  In 
light of this, some researchers have endorsed excluding participants who score below this threshold, due to concerns that these 
participants could have scored higher by ignoring the math problems and focusing on the recall task (e.g., Unsworth et al., 2005).  
However, we found that arithmetic errors were highly correlated with OSPAN scores (r = -.45).  Thus, we reasoned that 
excluding participants on the basis of arithmetic performance might remove important variance from the OSPAN scores.  
Importantly, all of our participants scored well above chance performance for the arithmetic portion of the task. 
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dimensional scores (rho = .01, p = .95), suggesting that the relation between worry and working 
memory capacity cannot be accounted for by co-occurring depression. 
 Results from the longitudinal analyses are presented in Table 2.  Again, as predicted, 
working memory composite scores predicted levels of worry at follow-up, even after taking into 
account initial worry (F-change = 5.94, p < .05).  Specifically, working memory composite 
scores were negatively associated with worry at follow-up, suggesting that reduced WMC could 
lead to increases in worry over time.  This association is portrayed graphically in Figure 1.  In 
contrast, working memory composite scores did not predict anhedonic depression at follow-up 
(F-change = 0.84, p = .37), suggesting that the association between WMC and worry at follow-
up cannot be accounted for by an increase in general distress in participants with reduced WMC.   
Discussion 
Both self-report levels of worry and clinician-rated symptoms of GAD were negatively 
associated with working memory composite scores, suggesting that people with reduced WMC 
experience elevated levels of worry.  Furthermore, working memory composite scores predicted 
changes in levels of worry over time, suggesting that a reduction in WMC could confer risk for 
excessive worry.  In contrast, working memory composite scores were not associated with self-
reported or clinician-rated symptoms of depression, suggesting that the associations between 
worry, GAD, and WMC cannot be accounted for by co-occurring depression or general distress. 
Based upon these findings, as well as past research showing that worry manipulations 
lead to a reduction in processing resources, we propose that there is a bi-directional relationship 
between worry and WMC.  In other words, a trait-like reduction in WMC may make people 
prone to worry.  Conversely, this capacity is reduced when people engage in worry, as worrying 
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occupies some working memory resources.  This account would explain why recent studies have 
found that worry inductions only yield significant decreases in WMC in people with elevated 
levels of trait worry (Hayes et al., 2008, Leigh & Hirsh, 2011), as evidence suggests that 
individual differences in trait WMC are more evident when working memory demands are high 
(see Ilkowska & Engle, 2010).  Thus, while our findings provide support for the basic tenets of 
the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), our findings also suggest that this theory 
may not fully describe the nature of the relation between worry and WMC. 
Of course, the longitudinal analyses presented here only provide preliminary evidence for 
the proposal that reduced WMC can cause excessive worry; these data are by no means sufficient 
to establish that a causal relationship exists.  Rather, stronger longitudinal designs and/or 
experimental designs should be employed to rule out rival hypotheses that could account for our 
findings.  Additional evidence in support of this proposal would have important implications for 
our understanding the etiology of GAD, and in turn may have important implications for the 
treatment of this disorder.  To our knowledge, the present study is the first to show that GAD 
symptoms are association with reduced WMC.  While effective treatments exist for GAD (see 
Mitte, 2005), they are by no means a panacea.  In particular, while many participants benefit 
from these treatments, only a minority of patients are returned to “well” status (e.g., Fisher & 
Dunham, 1999).  The results of the present study suggest that alternative (or supplementary) 
interventions could be designed to remediate deficits in WMC as a means of treating GAD.  That 
said, it is important to note that the number of participants who qualified for a full diagnosis of 
GAD in our sample was low.  While existing evidence suggests that worry is dimensional 
(Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001), it will be important for future work to explore whether the 
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link between GAD and WMC can be replicated (in particular, in samples containing more 
individuals who meet full criteria for the disorder). 
In addition to the attention control theory, our findings may have important implications 
for a number of other prominent theories of GAD.  Information processing models (e.g., 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004) suggest that attentional biases for threat-related information play 
an important role in the etiology of GAD.  It is possible that these biases result, at least in part, 
from working memory deficits.  In line with this proposal, WMC is thought to reflect individual 
differences in attentional control (Engle, 2002), and some work suggests that basic attentional 
control deficits contribute to attentional biases for threat (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  
Likewise, Dugas and colleagues (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005) have proposed a 
cognitive-behavioral model of GAD in which they assert that elevated levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty lead to excessive worry.  Given that WMC has been linked to tolerance of ambiguity 
(MacDonald et al., 1992), we suspect that reduced WMC could contribute to the development of 
intolerance of uncertainty.  Finally, Wells (2005) proposed a meta-cognitive model of GAD in 
which he argues that negative beliefs about the utility of worrying lead people to try to suppress 
their worries, and so individuals who hold such beliefs and have difficulty suppressing unwanted 
thoughts will worry excessively.  Since WMC has been linked with individual differences in 
thought suppression (Brewin & Beaton, 2002), we propose that reduced WMC could contribute 
to difficulties suppressing worries once they arise, which, in combination with negative beliefs 
about worry, leads to excessive worry.  Of course, these ideas are merely speculative.  Additional 
research is needed to explore potential mechanisms involved in the relation between worry and 
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WMC, as well as to explore whether working memory deficits are associated with the initiation 
of worry, the termination of worry, or both (see Berenbaum, 2010). 
The findings from the present study might also help explain some inconsistencies in past 
research examining relations between working memory and emotional distress.  First, some 
inconsistencies have been reported about the nature of the working memory deficits associated 
with anxiety (e.g., Ikeda et al., 1996; Lavric et al. 2003), whereas some studies have failed to 
find any association at all (e.g., Santos & Eysenck, 2005).  We propose that these inconsistencies 
could be accounted for by the fact that these studies have used methods that were not specifically 
developed to measure/induce worry.  In fact, there is some evidence that somatic anxiety (or 
anxious arousal), which is distinguishable from worry (see Nitschke et al., 2001), selectively 
disrupts visuospatial working memory (Bredemeier et al., 2009; Shackman et al., 2006).  Second, 
we propose that working memory deficits reported in depressed individuals (e.g., Harvey et al., 
2004; Rose & Ebmeier, 2006) could be accounted for by co-occurring worry, given that we did 
not find that depression was associated with working memory composite scores. 
 In summary, we found the performance on working memory tasks predicted levels of 
worry, both cross-sectionally and prospectively.  These findings provide evidence to support our 
proposal that reduced WMC can confer risk for excessive worry (and in turn, GAD).  Thus, 
while some questions remain unanswered, our findings may have important implications for 
understanding the nature and causes of excessive worry, as well as its treatment. 




DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
 Major depressive disorder (MDD) is among the most common mental disorders; the 
lifetime prevalence of MDD is approximately 17% (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, 
& Walters, 2005).  Unipolar depression is associated with poor quality of life, which in turn is 
associated with poor work performance and social adjustment (Goldberg & Harrow, 2005; 
Rapoport et al., 2005).  In fact, unipolar major depression has been deemed the leading cause of 
disability worldwide (measured in years lived with severe impairment; Lopez & Murray, 1998).   
 Cognitive deficits may play a key role in understanding the impairment associated with 
depression.  Difficulty concentrating is a diagnostic feature of Major Depressive Disorder (APA, 
2000), and research has shown that people experiencing depression display a wide range of 
deficits in cognitive performance, including difficulties with attention, memory, and problem 
solving (see Levin, Heller, Mohanty, Herrington, & Miller, 2007 and Hammar & Ardal, 2009 for 
recent reviews).  Given the breadth of these deficits, some have argued that depression involves a 
general depletion in cognitive resources (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).  However, the 
results of numerous studies suggest that people with depression do have sufficient resources, but 
simply have difficulty initiating efficient cognitive strategies (e.g., Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Marx, 
Claridge, & Williams, 1992; see Hertel, 1994) and/or appropriately allocating these resources 
(e.g., Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009; Yee & Miller, 1994; see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1989). 
 Executive functioning (EF) involves the effortful guidance of behavior towards some sort 
of goal; these functions are particularly important in nonroutine situations, and seem to rely 
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heavily on the prefrontal cortex (Banich, 2009).  In light the findings discussed above, along with 
evidence for structural and functional abnormalities in prefrontal cortex associated with 
depression, some have argued that cognitive deficits in depressed individuals could result from 
deficits in EF (e.g., Levin et al., 2007; Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002).  In line 
with this proposal, there is now ample evidence to suggest that depressed individuals show 
impaired performance tasks that require EF (see Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001, Fossati, 
Ergis, & Allilaire, 2002, Ottowitz, Tondo, Dougherty, & Savage, 2002, and Rogers, Kasai, Koji, 
Fukuda, Iwanami, Nakagome et al., 2004, for reviews).  However, recent research suggests that 
the construct of EF is multi-dimensional (e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 
2000).  In the context of such findings, the nature of the EF deficits associated with depression 
remains unclear.  Some reviews have concluded that these impairments might be unique to 
inhibition (e.g., Fossati et al., 2002), some have concluded that they might be unique to set-
shifting (e.g., Austin et al., 2001), and some have concluded that EF is broadly impaired in 
depressed individuals (e.g., Rogers et al., 2004). 
There are a number of potential reasons for this lack of clarity.  First, most of the existing 
work in this area uses classic EF paradigms, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting task.  While 
most of these tasks are well-validated, they generally require the use of multiple aspects of EF 
(see Miyake et al., 2000).  As a result, impaired performance on these tasks can be difficult to 
interpret.  An alternative approach is to use tasks developed to tap specific dimensions of 
executive functioning (e.g., inhibition, set-shifting).  Second, most of the existing work in this 
area compares a group of diagnosed individuals with “healthy” controls.  Not only does this 
approach involve contrasting groups at the extreme ends of a continuum, but it also introduces a 
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number of potential confounds.  In particular, depressed individuals often experience co-
occurring difficulties with anxiety, which in turn have been linked with EF deficits (see Eysenck 
et al. 2007).  However, most existing research in this area fails to take into account co-occurring 
anxiety (see Levin et al., 2007).  Finally, most of the existing work in this area has focused on 
individuals who are currently depressed.  Nevertheless, depression tends to be an episodic 
phenomenon (Kessler, Zhao, Blazer, & Swartz, 1997).  Thus, it is important to consider whether 
or not participants have experienced depression in the past as well, as this may be indicative of 
an underlying vulnerability to depression.  This approach might prove particularly fruitful in 
discovering EF deficits that confer such risk, as opposed to deficits that are simply a by-product 
of participants’ current mood state.  In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that EF deficits 
associated with depression can persist even after depressed mood has remitted (e.g. Paelecke-
Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005).  Nevertheless, the existing work in this area has yielded 
inconsistent findings (see DeBattista, 2005), which could be a reflection of some of the 
methodological issues discussed above (e.g., co-occurring anxiety), or could simply suggest that 
some EF deficits persist after remission, while others do not. 
In the present study, we examined EF deficits associated with current and past MDD 
symptoms.  To do so, we employed tasks designed specifically to measure inhibition and set-
shifting, both of which have been identified as possible aspects of EF that are particularly 
impaired in depressed individuals.  In order to examine specificity, we also measured state mood 
and symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), which frequently co-occurs with MDD 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005; Kessler et al., 1997).  Finally, we measured processing 
and motor speed in order to examine whether impaired performance on the EF tasks could be 
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accounted for by psychomotor slowing. 
Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred and sixty two college students (57% female), ranging in age from 18 to 26 
years (M = 19.7; SD = 1.8), participated in the study3
Materials 
.  Most (58%) reported being European 
American, 17% were Asian American, 5% were African American, 11% were Latino/a, 3% were 
Biracial, and 5% selected the descriptor “other.”  Of these participants, 129 (79%) were recruited 
through the University of Illinois Psychology participant pool and received course credit in 
exchange for their participation.  The remaining 34 participants were recruited using flyers 
targeting individuals who have experienced problems with depression and/or anxiety, either 
recently or in the past.  This recruitment strategy was used to obtain better representation of 
individuals with elevated levels of distress in the sample.  Participants recruited via these means 
were paid $10/hour in exchange for their participation.  Only individuals with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no significant hearing problems were permitted to participate.   
Current and past symptoms of a Major Depressive Episode (MDE) and current symptoms 
Diagnostic Interview 
                                                            
3 Initially, 209 students participated in the study.  However, 11 participants reported that they were taking psychotropic 
medications.  Specifically, all of these participants were taking anti-depressants and/or stimulant medications.  In light of 
evidence that these medications can, for better or worse, influence cognitive task performance (e.g., Kempton et al., 1999; 
McClintock et al., 2010), these participants were excluded from our analyses.  Also, 47 participants did not complete the 
diagnostic interview. 
   
34 
 
of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)4
In our sample, 5 participants met full diagnostic criteria for a current MDE, 29 met full 
diagnostic criteria for a past MDE, and 6 met full diagnostic criteria for current GAD.  Because 
the rates of current MDE and GAD were fairly low, along with evidence that both depression 
and anxiety exist on a continuum of severity (Brown & Barlow, 2009; Haslam, 2003), we 
computed dimensional symptom scores for current MDE, past MDE, and current GAD by 
summing clinical ratings for all of the substantive criteria for these diagnoses.  Thus, current and 
past MDE scores could range from 0 to 20 (given that there are 10 criteria, each of which is rated 
between 0 and 2), and GAD ratings could range from 0 to 18 (given that there are 9 criteria).  To 
examine interrater reliability, secondary raters (all of who where graduate students in clinical 
psychology) listened to 25 randomly selected interviews, and intraclass correlations were 
computed by treating raters as random effects and the individual rater as the unit of reliability 
(see Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).  The intraclass correlations for current MDE, past MDE, and current 
GAD were .91, .92 and .96, respectively.  
 were assessed using the mood and anxiety modules of 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Nonpatient Edition (SCID-NP; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002).  These interviews were conducted by the lead author (KB), 
who is an advanced doctoral student in clinical psychology and has extensive experience 
conducting diagnostic assessments.  In line with SCID guidelines, “current” was operationalized 
as symptoms experienced in the past month, and each diagnostic criterion was rated on a 3-point 
scale (0 = absent, 1 = subthreshold, 2 = threshold).   
                                                            
4 Past GAD symptoms were also assessed, but very few participants reported experiencing more severe symptoms in the past, 
relative to symptoms their in the past month.  This is consistent with evidence that, unlike MDD, GAD tends to be chronic rather 
than episodic (Wittchen & Hoyer, 2001). 
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State positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) were measured using the Positive 
Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988).  The PA scale consists of 
10 pleasant emotion words (e.g., active, strong, proud), and the NA scale consists of 10 
unpleasant emotion words (e.g., jittery, guilty, ashamed).  Both scales were supplemented with 5 
additional low arousal emotion words (e.g., content, proud, bored, ashamed) to provide better 
coverage of the full range of positive and negative affect states.  State mood was assessed by 
asking participants to rate each item based upon how they felt “at the moment.”  Because the 
testing session was fairly long, the PANAS was administered twice, and scores from the two 
administrations were averaged.  Past research has shown that the PANAS is a reliable and valid 
measure of state mood in undergraduate and community samples (Watson et al., 1988; Crawford 
& Henry, 2004).  Average internal consistencies (measured in Cronbach’s alpha) for PA and NA 
in the present sample were .87 and .84, respectively.   
State mood 
Stop-signal task.  To measure inhibition, participants completed the STOP-IT task 
(Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008), a novel variant of the classic stop-signal paradigm 
(Logan, 1994).  In this task, participants must categorize shapes as either a square or a circle as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  On some trials (25%), an auditory beep occurs after the 
shape appears on the screen.  This sound serves as a “stop-signal”, and participants are told to try 
not to respond (or to inhibit their response) when they hear a beep.  The task consists of a 
practice block of 32 trials, followed by three experimental blocks of 64 trials each.  After each 
block, performance feedback is provided.  The primary dependent measure on this task is stop-
EF Tasks 
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signal reaction time (the estimated time that it takes the “stopping process” to finish – thus, 
higher scores suggest worse inhibition), which is determined using a tracking method.  
Specifically, the delay between the onset of the shape and the beep is 250 ms on the first stop 
trial.  Each time the participant is able to successfully inhibit their response, the beep occurs 50 
ms later on the next stop trial; otherwise, the beep occurs 50 ms earlier on the next stop trial.  
Participants are told that they should only be able to stop on approximately half of the stop trials.  
Mean RT on no-signal trials from this task were also examined as an index of processing speed 
(higher scores reflect slower processing). 
Plus-minus task.  To measure set-shifting, participants completed the plus-minus task 
(Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976).  This task consists of three lists of 30 two-digit 
numbers (prerandomized without replacement) on separate sheets of paper.  For the first list, 
participants are asked to add 3 to each number and write down their answers.  For the second list, 
participants are asked to subtract 3 from each number.  For the third list, the participants are 
asked to alternate between adding 3 to and subtracting 3 (i.e., add 3 to the first number, subtract 
3 from the second number, and so on).  Participants are instructed to complete each list as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  The dependent measure for this task is shifting costs, which 
was computed by taking the difference between the time each participant takes to complete the 
third list and the average of the times they take to complete the first two lists.  Thus, higher 
scores reflect larger switch costs, and thus worse set-shifting.  Error data for this task were also 
analyzed to examine possible speed-accuracy tradeoffs. 
Finger tapping test.  The Halstead-Reitan finger tapping test (Halstead, 1947; Reitan, 
1979) was administered to measure motor speed.  In this task, participants place their dominant 
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hand on a table, palm down and fingers extended, with their index finger resting on a lever that is 
attached to a counting device.  They are instructed to tap their finger as quickly as possible for 10 
seconds, keeping their hand and arm stationary.  Each participant completed four trials, which 
were timed using a stopwatch.  The dependent measure for this task is the average number of 
taps across the four trials (higher scores reflect greater motor speed). 
Procedures & Statistical Analyses 
  Participants were tested individually.  The order of the tasks and self-report 
questionnaires were counter-balanced across participants, while the clinical interview was 
always administered at the end of the session.  Individuals who reported clinically significant 
symptoms of psychopathology during the interview were given treatment referrals. 
 As expected, the dimensional symptom variables, as well as error scores from the plus-
minus task, were highly skewed.  Thus, we used non-parametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) 
for analyses involving these variables.  For the remaining analyses, we computed zero-order 
Pearson correlations.  Participants who met full diagnostic criteria for a current MDE were 
excluded from analyses involving past MDE dimensional scores5
Sixteen participants stopped significantly more or less than 50% of the time on stop trials 
for the stop-signal task, and thus were excluded from analyses involving performance indices for 
this task.  Likewise, 5 participants did not follow instructions properly on the plus-minus task, 
and thus were excluded from analyses for this task.  In addition, 1 participant was missing data 
for each of these tasks, 1 participant was missing data for the MDE dimensional variables, and 4 
.   
                                                            
5 The findings reported for past MDE symptoms did not change when participants who met full diagnostic criteria for a current 
MDE were included in the analyses. 
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were missing data for the GAD dimensional variable. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics for all of the measures are presented in Table 3, and correlations 
between symptoms, state mood, and performance indices from the cognitive tasks are presented 
in Table 4.  There was a significant association between current (but not past) MDE symptoms 
and stop-signal RT.  This finding is consistent with evidence that depression is associated with 
deficits in inhibition (e.g., Fossati et al., 2002).  However, current GAD symptoms were also 
significantly associated with stop-signal RT, as was state positive affect (and there was a trend 
for state negative affect).  This suggests that the association between current depression and 
inhibition may be driven by current distress, rather than being specific to depression. 
In contrast, only past MDE symptoms were significantly associated with switch costs on 
the plus-minus task.  This finding is consistent with evidence that depression is associated with 
deficits in set-shifting (e.g., Austin et al., 2001).  While current MDE symptoms were not 
significantly associated with switch costs, they were significantly associated with errors on the 
plus-minus task, which may suggest that individuals experiencing current depressive symptoms 
exhibited a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
None of these variables was significantly associated with mean RT on no-signal trials 
from the stop-signal task, and only state positive affect was associated with performance on the 
finger tapping task.  This suggests that the observed associations between depressive symptoms 
and EF are unlikely to be accounted for by deficits in motor or processing speed. 




 We found that current MDE symptoms were associated with deficits in inhibition, 
whereas past MDE symptoms were associated with deficits in set-shifting.  These findings 
highlight three potentially important methodological considerations for research examining EF 
associated with depression. 
 First, our findings highlight the utility of employing tasks that are designed to tap specific 
dimensions of EF.  Whereas some reviews have concluded that depression is associated with 
broad deficits in EF (e.g., Rogers et al., 2004), this conclusion may be the result of an 
overreliance on classic paradigms (e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sorting task) that require the use of 
multiple aspects of EF.  By employing relatively simple tasks designed to tap two critical 
dimensions of EF (inhibition and set-shifting), we found evidence for relatively distinct 
correlates of each.  Specifically, current MDE and GAD symptoms were associated with deficits 
in inhibition, as was state mood.  In contrast, only past MDE symptoms were associated with 
deficits in set-shifting.  Future research should employ this approach when examining EF deficits 
associated with psychopathology, which can be strengthened by employing multiple tasks to 
measure each dimension (see Miyake et al., 2000) as well as tasks designed to tap other 
potentially important dimensions of EF (e.g., fluency, planning, updating). 
 Second, our findings highlight the potential utility of measuring symptoms of anxiety and 
state mood in research on EF and depression.  While current MDE symptoms were associated 
with impaired inhibition, current GAD symptoms were as well, along with state positive affect 
(and to a lesser extent, state negative affect).  In fact, deficits in inhibition have been implicated 
in a range of mental disorders (see Nigg, 2000).  Thus, inhibition deficits associated with current 
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depressive symptoms may be function of current distress, rather than being unique to depression.  
Additional evidence to support this hypothesis could be obtained by using experimental designs 
to examine the effects of general stress/mood manipulations on inhibitory processes. 
Finally, our findings highlight the potential utility of measuring past as well as current 
symptoms.  In doing so, we found that past MDE symptoms were uniquely associated with shift 
costs, suggesting that people who have experienced elevated levels of depression in the past 
display a unique deficit in set-shifting that persists even after their symptoms have remitted.  As a 
result, these deficits are unlikely to be mere by-products of mood disturbances, and thus may 
represent an enduring vulnerability to depression.  Consistent with this idea, dopaminergic 
functioning has been implicated in set-shifting (O’Reilly, 2006) as well as the etiology of 
depression (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006).  The finding that set-shifting but not inhibition was 
associated with past depressive symptoms could help to explain inconsistent findings about the 
persistence of EF deficits in depression (DeBattista, 2005) – in other words, our findings suggest 
that some of these deficits may persist, while others do not. 
Of course, given that the present study used a college sample, caution must be exercised 
in generalizing from these findings.  While our sampling strategy has a number of potential 
strengths relative to alternatives (e.g., limited number of participants receiving treatment, greater 
variability in symptoms, less concerns about age-related declines in EF), it also has some 
potential drawbacks (e.g., relatively low rates of current MDE and GAD, many participants not 
yet through the age of risk for MDD).  Thus, our findings warrant replication in more diverse 
samples.  Furthermore, our measure of past MDE symptoms was retrospective, and thus is 
subject to recall bias (see Henry et al., 1994).  Ideally, future research should use prospective 
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designs.  On a related note, since the data from this study is cross-sectional, we cannot conclude 
whether the observed relations between depression and EF are causal.  For example, while it is 
possible that set-shifting deficits reflect an ongoing vulnerability to depression, it is also possible 
that these deficits are merely a by-product of other variables that are associated with risk for 
depression, such as rumination.  In fact, rumination has been linked with both risk for depression 
(e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and deficits in set-shifting (Altimorano et al., 2010).  These 
questions could also be addressed through the use of longitudinal designs, as well as through the 
use of cleverly designed experiments examining laboratory analogues of depression. 
In conclusion, the findings from the present study provide useful insights into the nature 
of EF deficits associated with depression, and in turn highlight a number of important 
methodological considerations for future research on this topic.   We found that current MDE 
symptoms, current GAD symptoms, and state mood were associated with inhibition, whereas set-
shifting was uniquely associated with past MDE symptoms.  Based upon these findings, we 
propose that set-shifting deficits cause vulnerability to depression, whereas inhibition deficits are 
a by-product of current distress.  This proposal should be tested in future research. 




INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE IN INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS 
Inattentional blindness (IB) is the failure to notice a visible but unexpected object when 
attention is focused elsewhere (Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser, 1979; Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
Most existing literature on this topic has used experimental designs to examine factors that 
influence rates of IB (or conversely, "explicit attention capture"; see Simons, 2000).  Based upon 
this research, a number of important factors that influence rates of IB have been identified, 
including the difficulty of the task that participants are engaged in (e.g., Simons & Jensen, 2009) 
and the degree of similarity between the unexpected object and what participants are supposed to 
attend to or ignore (e.g., Most, Simons, Scholl, Jimenez, Clifford, & Chabris, 2001).  However, 
in virtually all cases, there is some variability across participants – in other words, some people 
notice the unexpected object and others do not.  While it is possible that these differences result 
from variability in the effectiveness of the manipulation (e.g., some participants didn’t 
understand the instructions) or are simply due to chance (see Simons & Jensen, 2009 for a 
discussion of this issue), it is also possible that they result from stable individual differences that 
are related to cognitive performance. 
 Very few studies have attempted to examine individual differences in IB, and those that 
have focus on whether cognitive abilities related to attention predict noticing.  For example, 
influenced by the literature suggesting that expertise can influence attentional performance (e.g., 
Boot et al., 2008), Simons and Jensen (2009) examined whether individual differences in 
performance on the primary task (i.e., multiple object tracking) predicts rates of IB.   Despite the 
fact that increasing the difficulty of the task led to increased rates of IB, participants who were 
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better at performing the task were not more likely to notice the unexpected object.  More 
recently, based upon evidence that working memory capacity reflects individual differences in 
executive attention (see Engle, 2002), Richards and colleagues (Hannon & Richards, 2010; 
Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010) examined whether working memory capacity predicts 
rates of IB.  They found that participants with lower working memory capacity were less likely 
to notice the unexpected object (or conversely, more likely to exhibit IB). 
Given the challenges inherent in studying the relation between individual differences and 
IB (e.g., since there is only one “critical” trial, there is no way to examine reliability), these 
previously reported findings warrant replication.  Furthermore, we hypothesized that a 
participants’ current level of emotional distress will influence their likelihood of noticing an 
unexpected object.  Specifically, both anxiety and depression have been linked with attentional 
control deficits (see Eysenck et al., 2007 and Mialet et al., 1996), but to our knowledge no 
previous research has examined whether anxiety or depression are associated with IB6
Study 1 
. 
Both anxiety and depression are often conceptualized (and operationalized) in categorical 
terms.  However, existing evidence suggests that both are better conceptualized as a continuum 
of severity (see Brown & Barlow, 2009 and Haslam, 2003).  Thus, an alternative approach is to 
examine specific and distinguishable dimensions of emotional distress.   
Whereas both anxiety and depressive disorders are characterized by elevated levels of 
general distress, depression (but not anxiety) is associated with diminished motivation and 
                                                            
6 One previous study (Lee & Telch, 2008) examined whether socially anxious individuals are more likely to notice an unexpected 
face with a negative expression, but did not necessarily explore whether social anxiety is associated with the general phenomenon 
of IB. 
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pleasant mood (i.e., anhedonic depression), and anxiety (but not depression) is associated with 
increased physiological arousal (see Clark & Watson, 1991).   Furthermore, anxiety can be 
divided into two types: somatic anxiety (i.e., anxious arousal) and cognitive anxiety (i.e., worry) 
(see Barlow, 1991, Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997 and Schwartz, Davidson, & 
Goleman, 1978), which are distinct from one another and from anhedonic depression (Nitschke, 
Heller, Imig, McDonald, & Miller, 2001).  These three dimensions of emotional distress—worry, 
anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression—have different biological and behavioral correlates 
(e.g., Engels et al., 2010; Heller et al., 1997; Larson, Nitschke, & Davidson, 2007).  Thus, in the 
present study, we administered instruments specifically designed to tap these three constructs. 
Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred thirty four college students (58% female), ranging in age from 18 to 22 
years (M = 19.0; SD = 1.0), participated in the study for course credit.   Only individuals who 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision were permitted to participate. 
Materials 
Inattentional blindness task.  Participants completed a sustained attention task, with a 
single critical trial to measure IB.  This task will be based upon Most and colleagues (2001); a 
schematic of the task is shown in Figure 2.  In this task, participants completed successive trials 
of a dynamic multiple object tracking task, in which they were instructed to monitor the 
movement of four white shapes but ignore the four black shapes.  For both colors, two of the 
Cognitive Tasks 
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shapes were capital Ls and two of the shapes were capital Ts.  Participants were instructed to 
count the total number of times any of the white shapes touch the sides of a 640 x 480 gray 
window centered on the screen.  Each trial lasted approximately 12 seconds, after which 
participants were prompted to type the total number of times the white shapes touched the sides 
of the window.  Participants completed four trials on which all of the items move at a standard 
speed, followed by one critical trial.  On this critical trial, after 4 seconds of object motion, a 
gray cross entered the display vertically centered on the right, moved linearly across the display 
from right to left, and exited the display at the vertical midpoint on the left side. The gray cross 
was visible for 4 seconds, moving at the same rate as the rest of the items in the display.  After 
the cross exited the display, the objects continued moving for 4 seconds.  After reporting the 
number of touches, participants were asked “Did you notice anything other than the Ls and Ts on 
that last trial?”  If they respond affirmatively, they were asked to describe what they saw.  For 
these two questions, participants typed their responses into a text field on the display.  Those 
who were able to accurately describe at least one feature of the expected stimulus (shape, color, 
direction of motion) were considered to have noticed it, while those who reported that they did 
not notice anything unexpected were considered to have experienced inattentional blindness.  
Tracking accuracy was computed in a relatively conservative fashion; counts within 20% above 
or below the actual number of bounces (rounding up) were treated as correct.  Percent accuracy 
for the first four non-critical trials was computed as an index of primary task performance7
N-back tasks.  Participants also completed verbal and spatial versions of a two-item n-
back task (Owen et al., 2005).  In this task, participants view a sequence of 20 capital and lower 
. 
                                                            
7 The results did not change when other approaches for computing tracking accuracy were used (e.g., absolute accuracy, relative 
accuracy). 
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case letters, each of which appears at one of 10 possible spatial locations on a computer screen.  
When each letter appears, participants are instructed to press the “s” key if the item is the same 
as the item that appeared two items back (i.e., not the item immediately before it, but the one 
before that), or the “d” key if the item is different.  In the letter version of the task, participants 
report whether the item is the same letter as the one that appeared two items earlier, or if it is a 
different letter.  In the spatial version, participants report whether the item is in the same spatial 
location as the one that appeared two items earlier.  Each item appears for 500 ms (with a 2000 
ms ITI), and nonresponses are treated as errors.  Participants completed five blocks of each 
version, and the first block for each was treated as practice.  The dependent measure for this task 
is percent accuracy.  Since each participant completed both versions, scores were standardized 
and summed as an index of working memory capacity. 
Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 
1990).  The PSWQ is composed of 16 items (e.g., “My worries overwhelm me”).  Past research 
has shown that the PSWQ has excellent test-retest reliability and good convergent and 
discriminant validity in undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer et al., 1990; Nitschke et al., 
2001).  Internal consistency (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) for the PSWQ in the present 
sample was .93. 
Self-report Questionnaires 
 Anxious arousal was measured using the relevant subscale from the Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al., 1995).  On the MASQ, individuals indicate how 
frequently they have experienced a variety of different symptoms during the past week.  The 
anxious arousal subscale is composed of 17 items related to somatic tension and sympathetic 
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hyperarousal (e.g., “hands were shaky", "startled easily").  Past research indicates that the 
anxious arousal subscale of the MASQ has good convergent and discriminant validity in 
undergraduate, community, and clinical samples (Watson et al., 1995; Nitschke et al., 2001).  
Internal consistency in the present sample was .84. 
Anhedonic depression was also measured using the relevant subscale from the MASQ.  
The anhedonic depression subscale is composed of 22 items related to experiences of pleasant 
mood and symptoms that are specific to depression (e.g., “felt like nothing was very enjoyable”, 
“felt really slowed down”).  Like the anxious arousal subscale, past research indicates that the 
anhedonic depression subscale has good convergent and discriminant validity in undergraduate, 
community, and clinical samples (Watson et al., 1995; Nitschke et al., 2001).  Internal 
consistency in the present sample was .90. 
Procedures 
Participants were tested individually.  All participants completed the questionnaires first, 
followed by the n-back tasks (in counterbalanced order), followed by the inattentional blindness 
task.  Twenty seven participants did not score significantly above chance performance (i.e., 
above 60%) on one or both versions of the n-back task, and thus were excluded from analyses for 
working memory capacity.   
Results and Discussion 
The top half of Table 5 contains descriptive statistics for the self-report measures of 
worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression.  In this sample, 88 (70.4%) participants 
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reported noticing the unexpected stimuli and provided an adequate description8
The top half of Table 6 contains means on all of the performance indices for participants 
who did and did not notice the unexpected stimulus.  To test whether the performance indices 
predicted which individuals noticed the unexpected stimulus, we conducted a separate logistic 
regression analysis for each predictor
.  
9
Worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression did not significantly predict IB when 
these variables were considered separately.  However, exploratory analyses revealed a significant 
three-way interaction between these variables predicting IB.  The statistics from this regression 
analysis are presented in the top half of Table 7, and a graphical illustration of the nature of this 
interaction is presented in the top panel of Figure 3.  As shown in Figure 3, there was a cross-
over interaction between worry and anxious arousal predicting IB in participants reporting 
elevated levels of anhedonic depression.  Specifically, among individuals with high anhedonic 
depression, greater worry was associated with more noticing among individuals low in anxious 
arousal, whereas greater worry was associated with less noticing among individuals high in 
.  The Wald statistics and p-values from these analyses are 
presented in Table 6.  Consistent with Simons and Jensen (2009), tracking accuracy on the non-
critical trials did not significantly predict IB.  Inconsistent with findings reported by Richards 
and colleagues (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2010), working memory capacity was 
also not a significant predictor of IB. 
                                                            
8 Eight participants reported noticing something unexpected on the last trial but did not accurately describe the unexpected 
stimulus, and thus were excluded from analyses.  The results were virtually identical when these individuals were treated as non-
noticers, rather than excluding them. 
 
9 Logistic regression was used for these analyses (as opposed to independent sample t-tests) since the number of participants who 
noticed the unexpected stimulus and the number who did not notice were unequal.  Nevertheless, our findings did not differ when 
t-tests were conducted instead of logistic regression analyses.  Likewise, the results were quite comparable when the predictors 
were entered simultaneously in the regression analyses (rather than separately). 
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anxious arousal.   In contrast, this pattern was not present in participants with diminished levels 
of anhedonic depression.  Rather, for these participants, elevated levels of anxious arousal were 
associated with slightly higher rates of noticing, regardless of their reported levels of worry. 
  In summary, multiple object tracking ability did not predict IB, supporting the notion 
that individuals who notice the unexpected stimuli are not simply performing the primary task 
worse (or better).  Working memory capacity also did not predict IB, suggesting that individual 
differences in executive attention, while related to measures of implicit attention capture 
(Conway & Kane, 2001), do not predict explicit attention capture (see Most & Simons, 2001).  
Finally, anxiety and depression did not predict IB when analyzed alone, but did so interactively.  
This finding is consistent with evidence showing that anxiety and depression are associated with 
deficits in attentional control (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007, Mialet et al., 1996), and suggest that 
these deficits extend to the phenomenon of explicit attention capture.  However, our findings 
suggest that an individual’s pattern of anxiety and depressive symptoms may be particularly 
important, rather than their levels on each dimension alone.  
Study 2 
In Study 1, participants completed 4 trials of the multiple object tracking task, followed 
by a critical trial which contained an unexpected stimulus.  Thus, given that participants received 
very little exposure to the primary task before the critical trial, it is not too surprising that rates of 
IB were somewhat low in this sample, which is not ideal for examining individual differences in 
IB.  At the same time, this design did not provide a particularly strong measure of tracking 
performance.  To address these concerns, in Study 2, we employed a multiple object tracking 
task that was comparable to the task used in Study 1, but using some methodological 
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modifications developed by Simons and Jensen (2009).  These modifications were designed to 
provide a better index of primary task performance, while at the same time providing participants 
with more experience performing the task. 
In Study 1 we found that working memory capacity did not predict IB.  This result is 
inconsistent with recent findings reported by Richards and colleagues (Hannon & Richards, 
2010; Richards et al., 2010).  One potential explanation for this discrepancy is that Richards and 
colleagues used a different measure of working memory capacity - the operation span task.  
Thus, in Study 2, we explored whether our findings from Study 1 would replicate in a larger 
sample using the same working memory task as Richards and colleagues (in addition to the n-
back tasks).  In light of recent evidence that working memory and executive functioning tasks tap 
a common executive attention construct (see McCabe et al., 2010), we also administered tasks to 
measure other dimensions of executive functioning (i.e., response inhibition, set-shifting) to see 
whether these abilities predict IB, as well as to examine whether reported links between IB and 
working memory capacity might be accounted for by other executive deficits. 
Likewise, the observed interaction between dimensions of anxiety and depression was not 
predicted.  Thus, it is important to examine whether this finding will replicate in a larger sample 
with more participants who are experiencing elevated levels of anxiety and/or depression. 
Finally, a potential limitation of Study 1 is that we did not collect information about 
participants’ familiarity with the concept of IB.  A common practice in IB research is to exclude 
participants with knowledge of IB from analyses (e.g., Most et al., 2001; Simons & Jensen, 
2008; Richards et al., 2010), due to concerns that they may be less likely to exhibit IB as a result 
of this familiarity.  Thus, failing to exclude these participants could invalidate findings. 





 One hundred ninety six college students (55% female), ranging in age from 18 to 26 
years (M = 19.6; SD = 1.7), participated in the study10
Materials 
.  Of these participants, 161 were recruited 
through the University of Illinois Psychology participant pool and received course credit in 
exchange for their participation.  The remaining 35 participants were recruited using flyers 
targeting individuals who had experienced problems with anxiety or depression, either recently 
or in the past.  This recruitment strategy was used to obtain better representation of individuals 
with elevated levels of anxiety and depression in the sample.  Participants recruited via these 
means were paid $10/hour in exchange for their participation.  Only individuals with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no significant hearing problems were permitted to participate.  
Inattentional blindness task.  As in Study 1, participants completed successive trials 
involving a dynamic multiple object tracking task, in which they were instructed to monitor the 
movement of four white letters but ignore the four black letters.  After 5 practice trials, 
participants complete a block of trials in which the speed of the objects in the display was 
adjusted based upon counting accuracy.  Counts were considered accurate if the response is 
within 20% of the correct total, rounding up.  Following an accurate count, the speed of the 
Cognitive Tasks 
                                                            
10 Initially, 207 students participated in the study.  However, 11 participants reported that they were taking psychotropic 
medications.  Specifically, all of these participants were taking anti-depressants and/or stimulant medications.  In light of 
evidence that these medications can, for better or worse, influence cognitive task performance (e.g., Kempton et al., 1999; 
McClintock et al., 2010), these participants were excluded from our analyses. 
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objects was increased, and following an inaccurate count, it was decreases.  In this manner, the 
object speeds were adjusted for each individual in order to achieve a consistent level of accuracy 
across participants.  In this case, the accuracy threshold was set at 75%.  The dependent measure 
for this portion of the task is threshold tracking speed (i.e., how fast a participant could track the 
objects and still achieve 75% accuracy), measured in pixels/second.  Immediately after 
determination of the threshold speed, participants completed four trials on which all of the items 
move at a standard speed (4.32°/second), followed by one critical trial.   
 During the debriefing portion of the study, each participant was asked: 1) whether they 
had heard of the concept of ‘inattentional blindness’ (and if so, to describe what it means in their 
own words); and 2) whether they had ever seen any famous IB demonstrations (e.g., ‘gorillas in 
our midst’; Simons & Chabris, 1999).  Follow-up (clarification) questions were asked as needed. 
N-back tasks.  As in Study 1, verbal and spatial versions of a two-item n-back task were 
administered, and standardized accuracy scores from these two tasks were summed to provide an 
index working memory capacity. 
Automated operation span task.  Participants also completed an automated version of the 
operation span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  In this task, participants are 
presented with a set of arithmetic operations (e.g., "(6 x 2) - 5 = ??”) which they must solve as 
quickly as possible, each of which is followed by a letter to remember.  At the end of each set of 
problems, participants are asked to recall the letters that appeared in the proper order, and 
accuracy feedback is provided.  The number of letters in each set varies from three to seven, and 
participants complete three of each set size.  The dependent measure for this task is the OSPAN 
score, computed by summing all of the perfectly recalled sets.  Thus, possible scores range from 
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0 to 75.  Past research suggests that these scores have excellent test-retest reliability (r = .83; 
Unsworth et al., 2005).  The automated OSPAN task is entirely mouse driven, and thus allows 
participants to complete the task independently.  Furthermore, since letters are used rather than 
words, performance is less reliant on word knowledge than many other memory span tasks 
(including the traditional OSPAN task).  Nevertheless, scores on the automated OSPAN are 
highly correlated with scores on the traditional OSPAN (r = .66), suggesting that this task 
adequately taps working memory capacity (Unsworth et al., 2005). 
Stop-signal task.  To measure response inhibition, participants completed the STOP-IT 
task (Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008), a novel variant of the classic stop-signal paradigm 
(Logan, 1994).  In this task, participants must categorize shapes as either a square or a circle as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  On some trials (25%), an auditory beep occurs after the 
shape appears on the screen.  This sound serves as a “stop-signal”, and participants are told to try 
not to respond (or to inhibit their response) when they hear a beep.  The task consists of a 
practice block of 32 trials, followed by three experimental blocks of 64 trials.  After each block, 
visual performance feedback is provided.  The primary dependent measure on this task is stop-
signal reaction time (the estimated time that it takes the “stopping process” to finish), which is 
determined using a tracking method.  Specifically, the delay between the onset of the shape and 
the beep is 250 ms on the first stop trial.  Each time the participant is able to successfully inhibit 
their response, the beep occurs 50 ms later on the next stop trial; otherwise, the beep occurs 50 
ms earlier on the next stop trial.  Participants are informed that they should only be able to stop 
on approximately half of the stop trials. 
Plus-minus task.  To measure set-shifting, participants complete the plus-minus task 
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(Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976).  This task consists of three lists of 30 two-digit 
numbers (prerandomized without replacement) on separate sheets of paper.  For the first list, 
participants are asked to add 3 to each number and write down their answers.  For the second list, 
participants are asked to subtract 3 from each number.  For the third list, the participants are 
asked to alternate between adding 3 to and subtracting 3 (i.e., add 3 to the first number, subtract 
3 from the second number, and so on).  Participants are instructed to complete each list as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  The dependent measure for this task is shifting costs, which 
was computed by taking the difference between the time each participant takes to complete the 
third list and the average of the times they take to complete the first two lists.   
 Worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression were measured using the same self-
report questionnaires as in Study 1.  Internal consistencies for the PSWQ, MASQ anxious 
arousal subscale, and MASQ anhedonic depression subscale were .94, .79, and .93, respectively. 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually.  The order of all of the questionnaires and cognitive 
tasks was randomized to address potential concerns about fatigue and/or task order effects 
interacting with the individual difference variables of interest (e.g., working memory capacity, 
anxiety).  Thirty four participants did not score significantly above chance performance (i.e., 
above 60%) on one or both versions of the n-back task.  Likewise, 19 participants stopped 
significantly more or less than 50% of the time on stop trials for the stop-signal task, and 5 
participants did not follow instructions properly on the plus-minus task.  Data for these 
participants was not included in analyses for these tasks.   
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Results and Discussion 
The bottom half of Table 5 contains descriptive statistics from the self-report measures.  
In this sample, 50 (27.2%) participants reported noticing the unexpected stimuli and provided an 
adequate description11
The bottom half of Table 6 contains means on all of the performance indices for 
participants who did and did not notice the unexpected stimulus.  Again, to test whether the 
performance indices predicted which individuals noticed the unexpected stimulus, we conducted 
a separate logistic regression analysis for each predictor.  Consistent with Simons and Jensen 
(2009) and with Study 1, tracking thresholds did not significantly predict IB.  Inconsistent with 
findings reported by Richards and colleagues (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2010) 
but consistent with our findings from Study 1, working memory capacity (measured using the n-
back tasks and the OSPAN) did not significantly predict IB.  In fact, although there was a trend 
.  A large percentage of our participants reported having previous 
knowledge of IB during the debriefing (knowledge of IB concept: 26%; familiarity with IB 
demos: 53%).  Thus, rather than simply excluding a large portion of our sample from the 
analyses, we conducted cross-tabulation analyses to determine whether rates of IB actually 
varied as a function of previous knowledge of IB.  We found that rates of noticing did not 
significantly differ in those who were familiar with the IB concept (28.0%) from those who were 
not (22.4%; χ2 = .57, p = .45).  Likewise, rates of noticing did not differ in those who have 
previously seen IB demonstrations (27.1%) relative to those who had not (27.1%; χ2 = .00, p = 
.99).  In light of these findings, we did not exclude any participants from analyses based upon 
their responses to these questions. 
                                                            
11 Twelve participants reported noticing something unexpected on the last trial but did not accurately describe it.  In both 
samples, the results were virtually identical when these individuals were treated as non-noticers, rather than excluding them. 
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for OSPAN scores, it is important to note that this trend was in the opposite direction to those 
observed by Richards and colleagues (i.e., participants who experienced IB had higher scores).  
Performance indices from the other executive functioning tasks also did not significantly predict 
noticing, which replicates and extends findings reported by Richards et al. (2010) showing that 
performance on an inhibition task is not associated with IB.  Collectively, these findings suggest 
the individual differences in executive functioning do not predict explicit attention capture. 
Again, worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression did not predict IB when 
considered in isolation.  However, consistent with Study 1, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between these variables predicting IB.  The statistics from this regression analysis are 
presented in bottom half of Table 7, and a graphical illustration of the nature of this interaction is 
presented in the bottom panel of Figure 3.  Importantly, even though rates of IB were much 
higher in this sample, the pattern of this interaction was quite comparable to the pattern observed 
in Study 1 (except that the main effect of anxious arousal was not as strong). 
 In summary, neither familiarity with the concept of IB nor popular IB demonstrations 
predicted whether or not participants notice the unexpected stimuli, suggesting that it is not 
necessary to exclude participants with previous knowledge of IB due to concerns that rates of IB 
will be lower in these participants.  Likewise, participants’ ability to perform the primary 
(tracking) task did not predict IB, replicating our findings from Study 1, as well as previous 
research (Simons & Jensen, 2009).   
As in Study 1, working memory capacity did not predict IB, nor did other aspects of 
executive functioning.  Again, these findings suggest that individual differences in executive 
attention (which has been proposed as a common component of executive functioning and 
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working memory capacity; McCabe et al., 2010) do not play a prominent role in explicit 
attention capture.  In contrast, the interaction of worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic 
depression did predict IB, thus replicating our finding from Study 1.  These findings suggest that 
anxiety and depression are associated with explicit attention capture, but in an interactive rather 
than additive fashion.  In other words, it is the pattern of emotional distress that an individual is 
experiencing that matters, rather than their levels on any particular distress dimension alone. 
As predicted, giving people more experience with the tracking task led to increased rates 
of IB in this sample (relative to Study 1).  Our rationale for predicting that this would be the case 
was fairly simple – when participants are still getting used to performing the task, they may be 
more vigilant for things that are unexpected (as a means of monitoring whether or not they are 
performing the task correctly).  However, it is important to note that this effect is inconsistent 
with the recent finding that “training” on the tracking task leads to lower rates of IB (Richards et 
al., 2010).  This inconsistency may suggest that the relation between experience with the primary 
task and IB is complex.  For example, this relation may be non-linear, in that more experience 
initially leads to lower rates of IB (e.g., as participants become comfortable with the task 
instructions), but beyond a certain point, more experience leads to higher rates of IB (e.g., as 
participants get bored with the task).  Researchers should take this issue into consideration when 
planning studies to examine individual differences in IB, in order to maximize variance (and in 
turn, statistical power). 
General Discussion 
Using two different methods to gauge primary task performance (accuracy on standard 
speed trials in Study 1 and tracking speed thresholds in Study 2), we found that individual 
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differences in how well people were able to perform the primary tracking task do not predict IB.  
These findings replicate previous reports (Simons & Jensen, 2009), and thus lend strong support 
to the claim that, while task demands do influence rates of IB, individuals’ ability to handle these 
demands do not.  Interestingly, we also found that performance on (other) tasks designed to 
measure aspects of executive functioning did not predict IB.  These findings replicate and extend 
previous reports (Richards et al., 2010), and again support the claim that participants’ ability to 
handle task demands do not predict whether or not they will exhibit IB.  Likewise, these findings 
suggest that individual differences in executive attention do not play a prominent role in explicit 
attention capture. 
Importantly, across multiple samples and measures, we did not find that working memory 
capacity predicted IB, which is inconsistent with findings recently reported by Richards and 
colleagues (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2010).  There are a number of possible 
explanations for this inconsistency.  First, Richards and colleagues used samples that included a 
large age range, whereas both of our samples consisted entirely of college students.  Including 
older participants may be problematic given evidence of cognitive declines associated with 
aging, including declines in working memory capacity (see Salthouse, 1994) and increases in IB 
(Graham & Burke, 2011).  While Richards and colleagues did show that age did not predict IB in 
their samples, they did not report whether they examined possible interactions between age and 
working memory capacity.  Another possibility is that the participants tested by Richards and 
colleagues were particularly good at performing the tracking task, and thus those participants 
who also had “residual” resources were more likely to notice the unexpected stimulus.  In line 
with this idea, there is some very recent evidence to suggest that working memory capacity only 
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predicts IB in participants who perform the primary task perfectly (Seegmiller, Watson, & 
Strayer, in press).  On the other hand, there is no particular reason to suspect that the participants 
tested by Richards and colleagues were particularly skilled at tracking multiple objects, and 
exploratory analyses in our data (examining whether working memory capacity predicted IB in 
participants who did particularly well on the tracking task) did not support this speculation.   
Third, both studies conducted by Richards and colleagues used a single-trial design to measure 
IB (as did the recent study by Seegmiller and colleagues).  When participants are not provided 
with an opportunity to practice the tracking task, those with lower working memory capacity 
may need to devote relatively more cognitive resources to the process of understanding the task, 
rendering them less likely to notice the unexpected stimulus.  However, when participants are 
given more experience with the task, this effect goes away.  In line with this idea, Richards et al., 
(2010) showed that even very limited practice with the tracking task greatly decreases rates of 
IB.  Though they did not find a significant interaction between working memory capacity and 
task exposure, it is possible that more practice is required for the effect to disappear (plus, this 
study may have been significantly underpowered to detect such an interaction).  Finally, 
Richards and colleagues used a task in which the unexpected stimulus was physically salient 
(i.e., a red cross amongst white and black letters), whereas we used a task in which the 
unexpected stimulus was designed to be equally similar to both the attended and ignored stimuli 
(i.e., a gray cross amongst white and black letters).  Thus, it is possible that working memory 
capacity only predicts IB when the unexpected stimulus is physically salient (for evidence that 
colored objects are more likely to be noticed, see Koivisto, Hyona, & Revonsuo, 2004).  While 
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additional research is needed to test these ideas, our findings suggest that if working memory 
capacity is related to IB, it is likely that this relationship is strongly moderated by other factors. 
Interestingly, while performance on working memory and executive tasks did not predict 
IB, patterns of emotional distress did.  Specifically, we found a significant three-way interaction 
between levels of worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression predicting IB in both of our 
samples.  Importantly, these findings support the general conclusion that variability in IB is not 
simply a random phenomenon.  In fact, these findings raise the possibility that other stable 
individual differences variables (e.g., personality traits) might predict IB as well, given that 
anxiety and depression are associated with personality (particularly in those experiencing both, 
see Krueger et al., 1996).  Furthermore, these findings suggest that attention control deficits 
associated with anxiety and depression extend to the phenomenon of explicit attention capture.  
In light of evidence that IB has important implication for problems outside of the laboratory 
(e.g., contributions to automobile accidents; see Strayer & Drews, 2007), these findings may in 
turn have important implications for understanding how anxiety and depression influence daily 
functioning.  These findings also suggest that it is the pattern of symptoms that the individual is 
experiencing that matters, at least in terms of IB.  While we did not initially predict that this 
would be the case, researchers have argued that the relation between depression and cognitive 
performance is likely to be moderated by co-occurring symptoms of anxiety, and vice versa (e.g., 
Levin et al., 2007). Furthermore, there is some evidence showing that interactions between 
worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression predict cognitive processing and performance 
(e.g., Engels et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, additional research is needed to understand why these 
variables interact in the manner that they do to predict IB. 
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In Study 1, we did not collect information about participants’ previous knowledge of IB.  
While this could be problematic, in Study 2 we found that such knowledge did not predict IB. 
While we suspect that previous knowledge of IB would influence noticing in the same or a 
highly similar task (for evidence to support this, see Simons, 2010), our findings suggest that the 
impact of such knowledge does not generalize to unfamiliar tasks.  In line with this idea, research 
on problem-solving has consistently shown that exposure to problem solutions often does not 
generalize to similar problems, particularly when the problems only share structural features in 
common and the problem-solver lacks expertise in the problem area (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 
1980; Novick, 1988).  Importantly, these findings suggest that there is no need to exclude 
participants with previous knowledge about IB in research on this topic.  Nevertheless, additional 
research is needed to ensure that correlates of IB do not differ in those with such knowledge, 
relative to those without. 
 Of course, the current research has some important limitations.  First, since both of our 
samples consisted entirely of college students, caution needs to be exercised in attempting to 
generalize our findings.  While this sampling strategy does have potential advantages (e.g., less 
concerns about age related declines in cognitive functioning), our findings warrant replication in 
more diverse samples (including samples which include more individuals experiencing high 
levels of emotional distress).  Second, we used the same basic paradigm to measure IB in both 
studies.  Thus, future research should examine whether our findings will replicate using other IB 
paradigms (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998).  Third, we measured symptoms of anxiety and depression 
using self-report questionnaires, which may be subject to reporting biases.  Thus, our findings for 
anxiety and depression warrant replication using other assessment methods.  Finally, since the 
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data from this research is correlational, we cannot conclude whether any of the observed 
relations are causal.  For example, it is possible that symptoms of distress cause people to be 
more or less likely to exhibit IB, whereas it is also possible that other factors (e.g., lack of 
motivation, attention control deficits) account for this link.  Additional research using 
longitudinal and/or experimental designs are needed to explore this. 
In conclusion, we found that individual differences in IB were not related to participants’ 
ability to handle task demands (measured using their performance on the primary task at hand, as 
well as working memory and executive tasks).  On the other hand, participants reported levels of 
anxiety and depression did predict IB, suggesting that individual differences in IB are not simply 
random.  Furthermore, these findings suggest that attention control deficits associated with 
anxiety and depression may extend to the phenomenon of explicit attention capture, but that the 
nature of these relations depends upon participants’ levels of each. 





 The present research yielded a number of intriguing findings that help shed light on the 
nature of attentional and executive control deficits associated with dimensions of anxiety and 
depression.  In Chapter 2, we found that working memory capacity was negatively associated 
with worry and GAD symptoms, and predicted changes in levels of worry over time.  In Chapter 
3, we found that current depressive symptoms were associated with inhibition deficits, whereas 
past depressive symptoms were associated with shifting deficits.  In Chapter 4, we found that 
cognitive abilities (e.g., multiple object tracking, working memory capacity) did not predict 
inattentional blindness, but anxiety and depression did.  These findings, when considered in the 
context of existing research, highlight a number of important directions for future research 
examining attentional and executive control deficits associated with anxiety and depression.  
First, future research should employ a number of the strategies utilized in the present 
research (e.g., using measures designed to tap specific dimensions of anxiety and depression, 
using tasks designed to tap specific dimensions of EF) to examine attentional and executive 
control deficits in larger and more diverse samples, in particular samples which would be 
expected include more individuals with diagnosable disorders (e.g., treatment seeking samples).  
If research is able to clearly document specific attentional and executive control deficits, then 
such findings could be used inform the revision of diagnostic criteria for future editions of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  In doing so, it would also be valuable to 
include more extensive measures of other forms of psychopathology (e.g., substance use 
disorders, ADHD).  This would help rule out alternative accounts for findings, provide stronger 
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evidence of specificity, and ultimately inform theories about common and unique pathways to 
different forms of psychopathology. 
 Future research should also aim to develop and utilize more advanced methods for 
measuring cognitive deficits.  There are a variety of ways this can be achieved.  First, researchers 
can continue to adapt cutting edge tasks developed by cognitive psychologists as a means of 
exploring individual differences.  Nevertheless, in doing so, it is important to explore the 
psychometric properties of these tasks (e.g., test-retest reliability) to ensure that they are 
appropriate to use for such purposes.  Second, it can be advantageous to employ multiple 
measures of constructs of interest.  In doing so, statistical techniques such as factor analysis and 
latent variable analysis can be employed to explore the critical abilities that impact task 
performance, as well as to isolate shared variance (or conversely, remove method variance).  
Third, traditional (explicit) task performance indices can be supplemented with additional 
measures of cognitive processing and performance, including implicit measures (e.g., eye 
tracking) and psychophysiological measures (e.g., neuroimaging).  This approach can help 
circumvent some of the inherent limitations of traditional performance measures, in particular 
that lack of differences does not necessarily entail equivalent performance (i.e., equifinality), and 
that equivalent performance deficits can result from a number of different mechanisms (i.e., 
multifinality).  It might also be interesting to explore self-report methods of assessing task 
performance, in particular as a way to explore individual differences in factors such as strategy 
use, comprehension of task instructions, and task engagement.  In doing so, it would be 
important to thoroughly examine the validity of this approach by examining convergence with 
other methods.  That said, there is some evidence to suggest that self-report indices of cognitive 
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processing and performance can be fruitful, including the use of this methodology to assess 
awareness of unexpected stimuli in IB research (including in the present research) and awareness 
of mistakes in error monitoring research (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). 
While some findings from the present research provide evidence to support our proposal 
that attentional and executive control deficits play a role in the etiology of anxiety and 
depression, our findings are by no means sufficient to establish causal relations.  Thus, future 
research should continue to explore causal models of these phenomena.  First and foremost, 
stronger longitudinal designs should be employed to test our predictions and rule out rival 
hypotheses.  Likewise, experimental designs can be used in a creative fashion to examine 
laboratory analogues of anxiety and depressive disorders.  Second, future research should 
explore possible mechanisms that account for these relations by measuring proposed 
mechanisms (e.g., difficulty suppressing unwanted thoughts), particularly in the context of 
longitudinal and experimental designs.  Third, research should explore causal antecedents of 
attentional and executive control deficits (e.g., genes), as well as how these deficits may function 
in conjunction with other known causal factors.  For example, attentional and executive control 
deficits may serve as ‘endophenotypes’ (see Gottesman & Gould, 2003) which, when combined 
with other factors (e.g., life stress), confer risk for anxiety and/or depression. 
If attentional and executive deficits are found to play a role in the etiology of anxiety and 
depression, these findings could have important treatment implications that should be 
investigated in future research.  First, if some individuals who meet criteria for anxiety and/or 
depressive disorders exhibit these deficits but others do not, research could investigate whether 
these deficits make some clients less likely to respond to traditional interventions (and thus 
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contribute to the maintenance of these problems).  For example, current approaches to the 
treatment of anxiety disorders are dominated by exposure-based techniques.  Based on evidence 
suggesting that attentional focus during exposure sessions significantly influences long-term 
habituation (Foa & Kozak, 1986; see Grayson et al., 1982, Johnstone & Page, 2004, and 
Rodriguez & Craske, 1993), it seems quite plausible that attentional control deficits might 
compromise one's ability to benefit from exposure.  Likewise, cognitive-based interventions have 
been developed to treat both anxiety and depressive disorders which involve helping clients 
identify and change maladaptive thoughts and/or beliefs.  Again, it seems quite plausible that 
cognitive deficits could interfere with one's ability to benefit from these interventions.  In line 
with this notion, there is evidence that individuals with more self-reported "cognitive 
dysfunction" are less likely to benefit from cognitive therapy (Elkin, 1994).  If attentional and/or 
executive control do moderate responses to existing interventions, then assessment of these 
deficits could prove quite useful for informing treatment decisions.   
Perhaps more importantly, findings to support the notion that attentional and executive 
control deficits play a role in the etiology of anxiety and/or depression would suggest that these 
deficits may be an appropriate target for interventions.  In fact, cognitive remediation strategies 
are growing in popularity as interventions for chronic mental disorders, including schizophrenia 
(e.g., Silverstein, 2000) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (e.g., Klingberg et al., 2002).  
Interestingly, some of these interventions have targeted deficits similar to those found to be 
associated with dimensions of anxiety and depression (e.g., working memory deficits; Bell et al., 
2003).  Thus, similar approaches, either alone or in combination with traditional techniques, 
might be useful for treating anxiety and depressive disorders – particularly those with chronic 
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courses for which traditional treatment approaches are less successful (e.g., GAD, recurrent 
MDD).  In addition to traditional cognitive remediation strategies, mindfulness-based 
interventions may be another intervention that can be used to "remediate" attentional and 
executive control deficits associated with anxiety and depression.  Current conceptualizations of 
"mindfulness" suggest that mindfulness-based exercises (including, but not limited to, 
meditation) can help individuals develop the ability to intentionally regulate their attention (see 
Baer, 2003 and Kabat-Zinn, 1982).  Interestingly, there has been growing interest in the use of 
mindfulness-based interventions to treat chronic forms of anxiety and depression, coupled with 
evidence to support the efficacy of these interventions (e.g., Miller et al., 1995; Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2002; Segal et al., 2002).  Furthermore, there is evidence that mindfulness training can 
improve performance on cognitive tasks, including working memory and sustained attention 
tasks (e.g., Chambers et al., 2008).  In short, research should be conducted to evaluate the 
efficacy of interventions designed to remediate attentional and executive control deficits 
associated with anxiety and depression, as well as to explore whether improvements in these 
domains mediate changes resulting from both new and existing interventions. 
Finally, future research should examine the potential implications of research on 
attentional and executive control deficits associated with anxiety and depression for other areas 
of research.  For example, research has shown that anxiety and depression are associated with 
different types of emotion regulation problems (e.g., Mennin et al., 2007).  In line with the 
common-systems view (discussed in Chapter 1), these emotion regulation problems may arise 
for attentional and/or executive control deficits.  Likewise, findings from this area of research 
might prove useful in helping us to understand emotional sequelae of problems that have a well-
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established impact on cognitive functioning, such as traumatic brain injuries and multiple 
sclerosis.  While it is often assumed that these emotional problems are a natural result of 
individuals’ reactions to changes in their cognitive abilities (e.g., people with MS become 
depressed because a perceived loss of cognitive function; see Arnett et al., 1999), it is possible 
that these deficits lead to emotional problems for other reasons (e.g., they cause deficits in 
emotion regulation).  Finally, findings from this area of research can and should be used to 
inform theories and research on basic cognitive phenomena.  For example, our finding that 
symptoms of anxiety and depression predict inattentional blindness could help shed new light on 
the nature of this phenomenon.  In short, insights from research on attentional and executive 
control deficits associated with anxiety and depression could be used to generate novel 
hypotheses about topics such as the origins of emotional regulation deficits, the emotional 
consequences of cognitive disorders, and the mechanisms of explicit attention capture. 




Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and correlations between the worry and depression measures. 
 
 M SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. PSWQ 49.9 13.7 18 80 --      
2. WDQ-SF 23.1 8.7 10 47 .54 --     
3. MASQ-AD 55.3 14.9 26 90 .47 .64 --    
4. GAD Sx count 3.2 4.4 0 17 .70 .49 .37 --   
5. MDD Sx count 2.0 4.5 0 18 .29 .32 .34 .49 --  
6. FU WDQ, SF 22.3 7.8 10 40 .45 .68 .44 .30 .11 -- 
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Table 2.  Hierarchal regression analyses for the follow-up data. 
 
DV = Time 2 WDQ-SF Beta ΔR2 
Step 1   
  Time 1 PSWQ 





Step 2   
  Time 1 WM composite -.29* .08 
 
DV = MASQ-AD, time 2 Beta ΔR2 
Step 1   
  Time 1 MASQ-AD .57** .32 
Step 2   
  Time 1 WM composite -.13 .02 
 
NOTE: * = p > .05, ** = p > .01 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics and correlations between the measures. 
 
 M SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 
1. Current MDE Sx 1.7 4.3 0 18 --    
2. Current GAD Sx 2.9 4.3 0 17 .48 --   
3. State PA 2.9 0.6 1.7 5.0 -.09 -.15 --  
4. State NA 1.5 0.4 1.0 3.7 .37 .24 -.18 -- 

















1. Stop-signal RT 270.4 40.7 186.0 442.4 --    
2. Mean RT, no-signal trials 613.2 151.3 376.1 1013.9 -.17 --   
3. PM switch cost 15.9 11.6 -5.1 56.9 .11 .09 --  
4. PM errors 2.2 2.9 0 20 .07 .09 .11 -- 
5. Finger tapping 45.0 6.2 29.5 58.75 -.10 -.01 -.17 -.02 
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Current MDE Sx  .23** .04 .00 .22** .02 
Current GAD Sx .19* -.05 .01 .12 -.08 
State PA -.20* .12 .01 .03 .19* 
State NA .15t -.09 -.06 .19* .06 
Past MDE Sx  -.03 .07 .18* .00 -.05 
 
NOTE: t = p > .10, * = p > .05, ** = p > .01 
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Table 5.  Descriptive statistics for the self-report questionnaires. 
 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Study 1     
Worry 49.9 13.2 19 80 
Anxious Arousal 25.3 7.6 17 69 
Anhedonic Depression 52.9 14.9 28 98 
Study 2     
Worry 49.6 13.7 18 80 
Anxious Arousal 26.7 8.2 16 67 
Anhedonic Depression 55.4 15.0 26 90 
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Table 6.  Means (and standard errors) for participants who did and did not notice the unexpected 
stimulus, along with statistics from the logistic regression analyses. 
 




Study 1     
Tracking accuracy .62 (.05) .59 (.04) .226 .63 
WM capacity .39 (.32) .00 (.20) 1.076 .30 
Study 2     
MOT tracking threshold 137.1 (2.0) 136.9 (2.9) .000 .99 
WM capacity – N-back tasks -.09 (.16) .08 (.28) .087 .77 
WM capacity - OSPAN 43.7 (1.4) 39.7 (2.6) 2.116 .15 
Response inhibition 269.6 (3.9) 273.0 (5.6) .218 .64 
Set-switching 14.7 (1.1) 16.6 (1.4) .89 .35 
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Table 7.  Emotional distress predicting IB. 
 
 B (SE) P-value 










Worry x AA 
Worry x AD 







Worry x AA x AD -.95 (.44) .03 










Worry x AA 
Worry x AD 







Worry x AA x AD -.40 (.21) .05 
 







Figure 1.  Scatterplot showing the association between working memory composite scores and 
changes in levels of worry from Time 1 to Time 2. 
 









Figure 2.  Schematics of the non-critical (multiple object tracking) trials (a) and the critical 
(inattentional blindness) trial (b).






Figure 3.  Interactions between worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression predicting IB 
from Study 1 (a) and Study 2 (b). 






Figure 3 (cont.). 
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